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REVIVING THE FEDERAL CRIME OF 
GRATUITIES 
Sarah N. Welling* 
The federal crime of gratuities prohibits people from giving gifts to federal public 
officials if the gift is tied to an official act. Both the donor and the donee are liable. 
The gratuities crime is dysfunctional in two main ways. It is overinclusive in that it 
covers conduct indistinguishable from bribery. It is underinclusive in that it does 
not cover conduct that is clearly dangerous: gifts to public officials because of 
their positions that are not tied to a particular official act. 
This Article argues that Congress should extend the crime of gratuities to cover 
gifts because of an official’s position rather than leaving the crime to cover only 
gifts because of particular official acts. The danger to bias-free government 
because of gifting based on official positions is demonstrated in recent research on 
influence and reciprocity. The rule for reciprocity is powerful and hard to fight 
because participants are generally unaware it is operating on them. Gifting 
officials based on their positions is not adequately controlled by mandated 
disclosure or ethics prohibitions. This Article urges Congress to amend the 
gratuities crime to expand it and avoid the dangers of overcriminalization by 
inserting mens rea terms into the crime. The appropriate mens rea terms are 
knowledge of the facts for donees and knowledge of the facts and law for donors. 
Congress should also address the overbreadth of the crime by taking one situation, 
when donors transfer value to donees because of future official acts, out of the 
gratuities crime because it is indistinguishable from the crime of bribery. This 
Article proposes amendments to implement these changes in terms familiar to the 
federal criminal law.  
                                                                                                                
    * Ashland-Spears Distinguished Research Professor, University of Kentucky 
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INTRODUCTION 
The little-known federal crime called gratuities prohibits giving gifts to 
federal public officials if the gift is tied to an official act.1 Gratuities is a political 
corruption crime, a junior varsity version of bribery. Both the donor/private citizen 
and the donee/public official are liable, and liable to the same extent.2 The 
gratuities crime was enacted in 1962 and became effective in 1963.3 The crime 
needs to be amended after our 50 years of experience with it. 
The gratuities crime is dysfunctional in two main ways. It is overinclusive 
in that it covers conduct indistinguishable from bribery.4 It is underinclusive in that 
it does not cover conduct that is clearly dangerous—namely, gifts to public 
officials because of their office.5 Recent research shows how dangerous these gifts 
are in terms of influencing public officials based on the rule of reciprocity. The 
urge humans have to reciprocate is powerful and unconscious.6 Based on this 
research, when a donor transfers value to a donee, the injury to society is sufficient 
in terms of biased officials to warrant treating the conduct as criminal.   
Thus, the gratuities crime should be broadened to include gifts that are 
given to public officials because of their official positions but are not tied to a 
particular act. The United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California case, 
decided by the Supreme Court in 1999, established that such gifts are not covered 
by the gratuities statute.7 The Court’s main rationale was that the plain words of 
the statute require that the donor give the gift “for or because of any official act.”8 
The Court reached a defensible conclusion based on the words in the statute.9 The 
statutory language should be amended to cover gifts to public officials based on 
their positions. In this situation, even if the government cannot prove that the gift 
was tied to a particular official act, the gift is harmful and dangerous because it 
will lead to bias in the public official’s conduct based on the human inclination to 
reciprocate.10 
This Article first proposes that Congress amend the gratuities statute to 
correct these problems and second suggests a seamless and practical way to do so. 
Congress should extend the crime of gratuities to cover the situation where a donor 
transfers value to donees because of their positions. Prohibiting this conduct under 
criminal law is the best way to control it; merely mandating disclosure of the 
gifting or treating it under the ethics rules is not an effective method of control. 
                                                                                                                
    1. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (2012). 
    2. Id. Hereinafter, private citizen donors will simply be referred to as donors 
and donee public officials will be referred to as donees. 
    3. See 18 U.S.C. § 201. 
    4. See infra Part III. 
    5. See infra Part V.A. 
    6. See infra Part V.B.1–2.  
    7. 526 U.S. 398, 406–08 (1999). 
    8. Id.  
    9. See infra note 74 and accompanying text.  
  10. See infra Part V.B.1–2.  
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Concerns raised by potential overcriminalization11 may be addressed with the 
usual criminal law technique of adding a mens rea element to the statute. As of 
now, the statute has no mens rea term, and the courts have failed to develop a 
coherent theory of mens rea for the crime.12 Amending the statute to add a mens 
rea term will not only avoid the dangers of overcriminalization but will also 
eliminate confusion regarding the elements of the crime,13 and send the job of 
defining the elements back to the appropriate institution—Congress. 
Based on an analysis of the dangers and interests involved, this Article 
proposes adding mens rea terms that distinguish between donors and donees. 
Although courts have recognized that the liability of donors and donees is not 
interdependent,14 the proposal to impose different mens rea requirements for the 
two types of defendants has not been raised in legal literature. Congress should 
amend the gratuities statute to provide that donors are liable only if they know both 
the facts and the law, and donees are liable only if they know the facts. These mens 
rea best suit the actors because donees can be expected to know the law while 
donors should be protected from criminal liability unless they understand they are 
doing something wrong. 
This Article begins by describing the current elements and basic rationale of 
the gratuities crime in Part I. It then separates the situations to which the crime 
applies into four categories of conduct to examine the scope and application of the 
crime. Part II covers the situation when a donor gives something to a public 
official because of a personal act or relationship; the Article concludes that the 
crime appropriately does not cover this conduct. Part III covers situations where 
the donor gives something to a public official because of future official acts; Part 
III concludes that the crime does apply to this situation, but that its application is 
too broad because it is indistinguishable from bribery. Part IV covers situations 
where the donor gives something to a public official because of past official acts 
and concludes that the gratuities crime covers this conduct and works well. Part V 
discusses situations where the donor gives something to a public official not 
because of an identifiable official act, but rather because of the donee’s position 
generally; this Part concludes that the crime of gratuities does not apply to this 
situation currently, but it should. Part V then explains my proposal to expand the 
crime to cover gifts received because of official position and to avoid 
overcriminalization by adding mens rea terms. Finally, Part VI places these 
situations on a continuum of harm and, somewhat less theoretically, proposes 
                                                                                                                
  11. See George D. Brown, The Gratuities Debate and Campaign Reform: How 
Strong is the Link?, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 1371, 1372 (2006); Richard E. Myers II, Adaptation 
and Resiliency in Legal System: Complex Times Don’t Call for Complex Crimes, 89 N.C. L. 
REV. 1849, 1865–68 (2011). 
  12. See infra Part V.D.2.a.  
  13. See infra note 22.  
  14. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing 
United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Miller, 340 
F.2d 421, 424–25 (4th Cir. 1965)).  
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specific amendments to the statute to implement the suggestions.15 
I. BACKGROUND OF THE CRIME 
A. Birth and Elements 
The crime of gratuities prohibits transfers of value to federal public 
officials because of an official act.16 It became a crime in 1963 as part of a series 
of laws designed to deal with conflicts of interest in federal employees.17 The 
particular statute, titled Bribery of Public Officials and Witnesses, actually 
prohibits two crimes, bribery and gratuities.18 The term gratuities does not appear 
in the statute19 but is an accepted nickname for the crime defined in § 201(c)(1) of 
the statute20 which states: 
(c) Whoever— 
(1) otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge 
of official duty— 
(A) directly or indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of 
value to any public official, former public official, or person 
selected to be a public official, for or because of any official act 
                                                                                                                
  15. This Article excludes discussion of transfers of value to federal public 
officials that qualify as campaign contributions. Such contributions raise issues of 
constitutionality and campaign finance policy beyond the scope of this Article. See 
generally LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A 
PLAN TO STOP IT (2011); Samuel Issacharoff, Comment, On Political Corruption, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 118 (2010). After this exclusion, the issues that remain to be discussed 
include gifts to federal public officials, including elected officials, in forms other than cash, 
and any kind of gift, including cash, given to federal public officials who are appointed 
rather than elected. This Article uses the term public official to include federal employees in 
all branches of government at all levels. Professor Kathleen Clark has pointed out that some 
provisions exclude particular federal employees. See Kathleen Clark, Do We Have Enough 
Ethics in Government Yet?: An Answer from Fiduciary Theory, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 57, 58 
n.2; see also, e.g., Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch; 
Proposed Amendments Limiting Gifts from Registered Lobbyists and Lobbying 
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 56330 (proposed Sept. 13, 2011) (to be codified at 5 C.F.R. pt. 
2635) (proposing a regulation in executive branch gift rules to eliminate distinct treatment 
for career workers and political appointees). 
  16. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (2012). 
  17. The statute became effective in 1963 as part of an act codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 201–18 that had no name, but the chapter where it was codified, Chapter 11 of Title 18, 
is called “Bribery, Graft and Conflicts of Interest.” Roswell Perkins of the New York Bar, 
drafter of the statute, characterized the purpose as limiting government conflicts of interest. 
See Roswell B. Perkins, The New Federal Conflict-of-Interest Law, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1113, 
1113 n.2, 1114–15 (1963). 
  18. See 18 U.S.C. § 201. 
  19. Id. 
  20. See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 400 
(1999) (describing § 201(c)(1) as “the illegal gratuity statute”); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2C1.2 (2010); Brown, supra note 11, at 1375–76. 
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performed or to be performed by such public official, former 
public official, or person selected to be a public official; or 
(B) being a public official, former public official, or person 
selected to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by 
law for the proper discharge of official duty, directly or 
indirectly demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to 
receive or accept anything of value personally for or because of 
any official act performed or to be performed by such official 
or person[.]21 
The basic idea of the crime is that giving anything of value to a federal 
public official for or because of an official act is a crime for both the donor and the 
donee.22 The term public official includes all persons acting for or on behalf of the 
U.S. government.23 The statute describes things that may not be given as “anything 
of value.”24 Official acts include any decision on any matter that may be pending 
or may be brought before a public official.25 Some examples of the gratuities crime 
are described below.26 
                                                                                                                
  21. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1). 
  22. See, e.g., United States v. Hoffmann, 556 F.3d 871, 875 (8th Cir. 2009) 
(affirming jury instruction stating that crime had three elements: defendant gave 
unauthorized things of value to a federal employee for or because of an official act); see 
also United States v. Schaffer, 183 F.3d 833, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1999), vacated as moot, 240 
F.3d 35 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that the district court correctly instructed that gratuities 
crime has three separate elements: defendant knowingly gave thing of value to public 
official for or because of official act); United States v. Patel, 32 F.3d 340, 344–45 (8th Cir. 
1994) (finding that a jury instruction was proper that had three elements for the crime of 
giving an illegal gratuity); United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1982) 
(finding five elements to the illegal gratuity offense). Commentators have explored the 
elements of the crime. See generally Randall D. Eliason, Surgery with a Meat Axe: Using 
Honest Services Fraud to Prosecute Federal Corruption, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
929 (2009); Charles B. Klein, What Exactly Is an Unlawful Gratuity After United States v. 
Sun-Diamond Growers?, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 116 (1999); Joseph R. Weeks, Bribes, 
Gratuities and the Congress: The Institutionalized Corruption of the Political Process, the 
Impotence of Criminal Law to Reach it, and a Proposal for Change, 13 J. LEGIS. 123 
(1986). 
  23. Public official is defined as “an officer or employee or person acting for or 
on behalf of the United States or any department, agency or branch of Government 
thereof . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1). 
  24. Id. § 201(c)(1)(A)–(B). 
  25. Id. § 201(a)(3). 
[T]he term “official act” means any decision or action on any question, 
matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be 
pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in 
such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or 
profit. 
Id.; see generally United States v. Valdes, 475 F.3d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (interpreting 
“official act”). 
  26. See infra Part V. 
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The main limit on the crime is that transfers of value to public officials 
are prohibited only if they are given or received “for or because of any official 
act.”27 This phrase obviously excludes from the crime gifts given to federal 
officials for or because of birthdays, friendship, or other personal or emotional 
reasons.28 The Supreme Court has further construed this term “for or because of an 
official act” to require a link between the gift to the public official and a particular 
official act.29 The crime is not established by proof that a public official received a 
gift because of his official position or because of some undefined official act; 
rather, the gift to the official must be linked to a particular official act.30 
The statute also specifies the timing of the gift to the public official vis-á-
vis the official act.31 Gifts are prohibited if they are given or received because of 
any official act “performed or to be performed.”32 Thus, gifts to public officials are 
prohibited both for past official acts and for future official acts. 
B. Rationale 
Roswell Perkins, the drafter of 18 U.S.C. § 201, first articulated the 
rationale for the crime of gratuities by noting that “[t]he deleterious results of 
[allowing public officials to accept transfers of economic value from private 
sources] may range all the way from natural gratitude to economic dependence.”33 
Leading commentator George Brown has identified and collected more specific 
rationales for the crime;34 these generally focus on the threat that such gratuities 
pose to democratic values.35 Permitting gifts to public officials allows officials to 
use their public office for private gain.36 Gratuities raise the risk of preferential 
treatment for donors and undermine equality of access to government services.37 
                                                                                                                
  27. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1). 
  28. See infra Part II. 
  29. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 406, 414 
(1999). 
  30. Id. at 405–06. 
  31. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1). 
  32. Id.  
  33. Perkins, supra note 17, at 1119. 
  34. See George D. Brown, Putting Watergate Behind Us—Salinas, Sun-
Diamond, and Two Views of the Anticorruption Model, 74 TUL. L. REV. 747, 769–70 (2000) 
[hereinafter Brown, Putting Watergate Behind Us]; George D. Brown, The Gratuities 
Offense and the RICO Approach to Independent Counsel Jurisdiction, 86 GEO. L.J. 2045, 
2051–54 (1998) [hereinafter Brown, The Gratuities Offense]. 
  35. Brown, supra note 11, at 1398. 
  36. Brown, The Gratuities Offense, supra note 34, at 2054 (citing Beth Nolan, 
Public Interest, Private Income: Conflicts and Control Limits on the Outside Income of 
Government Officials, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 57, 72, 80–81 (1992)). 
  37. Id.; Nolan, supra note 36, at 80 & n.89, 81. The Fifth Circuit explained: 
The purpose of [the gratuities statute] is to reach any situation in which 
the judgment of a government agent might be clouded because of 
payments or gifts made to him by reason of his position “otherwise than 
as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty.” Even if 
corruption is not intended by either the donor or the donee, there is still a 
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Gratuities increase the risk that donees will have divided loyalties.38 Gifting to 
public officials contributes to inefficient government.39 Gratuities are really bribes, 
but the government cannot prove the quid pro quo or the basis for the exchange.40 
And, finally, gratuities have the appearance of impropriety.41 
C. Four Applications 
The situations where the gratuities crime might apply can be divided into 
four categories. These are 
1. Donor gives to a public official because of personal reasons. 
2. Donor gives to a public official because of a future official act. 
3. Donor gives to a public official because of a past official act. 
4. Donor gives to a public official because of his or her official position. 
These four applications are each discussed below. 
                                                                                                                
tendency in such a situation to provide conscious or unconscious 
preferential treatment of the donor by the donee, or the inefficient 
management of public affairs. These statutes, like the predecessor 
legislation, are a congressional effort to eliminate the temptation inherent 
in such a situation . . . . 
United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480 (5th Cir. 1978). Shortly after the crime was 
enacted, the Second Circuit explained: 
The awarding of gifts thus related to an employee’s official acts is an 
evil in itself, even though the donor does not corruptly intend to 
influence the employee’s official acts, because it tends, subtly or 
otherwise, to bring about preferential treatment by Government officials 
or employees, consciously or unconsciously, for those who give gifts as 
distinguished from those who do not. . . . The iniquity of the procuring of 
public officials, be it intentional or unintentional, is so fatally destructive 
to good government that a statute designed to remove the temptation for 
a public official to give preferment to one member of the public over 
another, by prohibiting all gifts ‘for or because of any official act,’ is a 
reasonable and proper means of insuring the integrity, fairness and 
impartiality of the administration of the law. 
United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 1965). 
  38. Brown, The Gratuities Offense, supra note 34, at 2054 (citing Evans, 572 
F.2d at 480; Perkins, supra note 17, at 1119). 
  39. Evans, 572 F.2d at 480. 
  40. Brown, The Gratuities Offense, supra note 34, at 2054–55 (citing Daniel 
Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 32 UCLA L. 
REV. 784, 850 (1985)). 
  41. Id. at 2054 (citing SPECIAL COMM. ON THE FED. CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAWS, 
ASSN. OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND FEDERAL SERVICE 219 
(1960)); see also Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319, 1327–28 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en 
banc) (stating that gratuities crime strikes at “the appearance of evil” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 
87-478, at 19 (1961))). 
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II. GIFTING BECAUSE OF A PERSONAL ACT OR RELATIONSHIP: 
APPROPRIATELY NOT CRIMINAL 
When a donor gives a gift to a federal public official because of a 
personal act or relationship, it is not a crime under the gratuities statute.42 This 
outcome is fine and needs no change, but a brief discussion of this limit on the 
crime is helpful for perspective on the conduct that is covered by the crime. 
Personal gifts are excluded from the crime by the statutory language that 
requires the gratuities to be given “for or because of an official act.”43 Official acts 
include any decision on any matter that may be pending or may be brought before 
a public official.44 If the gift is for or because of friendship or social purpose, it is 
not covered by the gratuity statute.45 
To establish that a gift was given or received because of an official act, 
the government must prove that the gift was in some part based on an official act.46 
The gift need not be based exclusively on an official act; this element is met if the 
gift is based in part on the donee’s official act and in part on personal reasons.47 
The courts developed this mixed-motive doctrine based on the rationale that a legal 
purpose should not immunize participants who also have an illegal purpose.48 
The courts have identified factors useful to distinguish personal gifts from 
gifts based on an official act. These factors are whether the donor treated the gift as 
an expense to be reimbursed by an employer;49 whether the donor deducted the gift 
                                                                                                                
  42. See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.  
  43. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (2012). 
  44. Id. § 201(a)(3) provides: 
[T]he term “official act” means any decision or action on any question, 
matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be 
pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in 
such official’s official capacity, or in such official’s place of trust or 
profit. 
Id. § 201(a)(3); see generally Valdes, 475 F.3d at 1322–23 (interpreting “official act”). 
  45. E.g., United States v. Hoffmann, 556 F.3d 871, 875 (8th Cir. 2009); United 
States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 99–100 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 
1076, 1080 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc), aff’d on other grounds, 447 U.S. 10 (1980). 
  46. See, e.g., United States v. Gaines, Nos. 92-5446, 92-5501, 1993 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 15310, at *17 (4th Cir. June 23, 1993) (unpublished); Biaggi, 853 F.2d at 99–100; 
Standefer, 610 F.2d at 1080; United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 
413–14 (1999). But cf. Hoffmann, 556 F.3d at 874–75 (stating that theory-of-defense 
instruction requiring acquittal if donor gave things “solely” because of goodwill and 
friendship was improper but instructions taken as whole were accurate; conviction 
affirmed). 
  47. Gaines, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 15310, at *17. 
  48. See United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 683 (2d Cir. 1990) (“A valid 
purpose that partially motivates a transaction does not insulate participants in an unlawful 
transaction from criminal liability.”); see also United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 245–
46 (3d Cir. 2011) (approving that jury instructions that allowed conviction of mail fraud 
based on dual purpose). 
  49. See, e.g., Hoffmann, 556 F.3d at 873 n.2, 874, 878. 
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as a business expense;50 whether the participants had a history of gift-giving before 
the donee became an official;51 whether the gift-giving continued after the donee 
was no longer an official;52 whether the donor gave comparable gifts to others;53 
whether the donor and donee had a social relationship outside their official 
capacities;54 whether the gifts fell into a pattern tracking the official acts;55 and 
whether the gift was unusually valuable.56 
With this limit in place, old friends from school may continue to share 
sports tickets and meals after one goes to work for the federal government based 
on their pre-existing personal relationship. College roommates may continue to 
exchange birthday and holiday gifts even after one of them becomes the Secretary 
of Commerce. Personal friends may give each other gifts, and this ability is not 
extinguished by the gratuities crime when one becomes a federal official. 
III. GIFTING BECAUSE OF FUTURE OFFICIAL ACTS: COVERAGE BY 
GRATUITY CRIME IS TOO BROAD AND INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM 
BRIBERY 
The gratuities crime covers gifts based on official acts “performed or to 
be performed.”57 The drawback to this language is that it is so broad that 
sometimes the gratuities crime is indistinguishable from bribery. Congress 
intended bribery and gratuities to be different crimes, with bribery being the more 
serious.58 Bribery does not require that the public official actually be influenced.59 
Instead, bribery only requires a mens rea of intent to influence (in the case of a 
donor) or the intent to be influenced (in the case of a donee). This mens rea for 
bribery—an intent to influence or to be influenced—is the main distinction 
between the crimes of bribery and gratuities.60 
                                                                                                                
  50. Id. at 873 n.2. 
  51. See Standefer, 610 F.2d at 1080. 
  52. Id. 
  53. Id. 
  54. See United States v. Gaines, Nos. 92-5446, 92-5501, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 
15310, at *18–19 (4th Cir. June 23, 1993) (unpublished); Standefer, 610 F.2d at 1080. 
  55. See United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 100 (2d Cir. 1988). 
  56. See, e.g., Gaines, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 15310, at *18; Biaggi, 853 F.2d at 
99–100. 
  57. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (2012). 
  58. See United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404–08 
(1999). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(4) (indicating a 15-year maximum sentence for 
bribery), with id. § 201(c)(3) (noting a two-year maximum sentence for gratuities). 
  59. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972); United States v. 
Arroyo, 581 F.2d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1978). 
  60. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 404 (stating that “distinguishing feature” of 
bribery is that it requires intent to influence or to be influenced); see 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1); 
see also United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 725, 728–29 (2d Cir. 1966); Brown, supra note 
11, at 1376. 
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Although this mens rea is the main difference, the language of the 
gratuities statute that refers to “any official act performed or to be performed”61 is 
confusing because it expands the crime of gratuities so much that it is 
indistinguishable from the crime of bribery. Based just on this statutory language, 
the crimes of gratuities based on future official acts and bribery were hard to 
distinguish before Sun-Diamond was decided.62 After Sun-Diamond required the 
government to prove a link between the gift and a particular official act, the crimes 
of gratuities and bribery became impossible to distinguish.63 
The problem arises when a donor gives a gift to a donee because of an 
official act “to be performed.” An act “to be performed” is a particular act in the 
future.64 In an effort to give this language meaning and explain how a donor can 
give a gift because of an act to be performed in the future without it also being a 
bribe—i.e., without the donor intending to influence the donee’s conduct—courts 
and commentators have conjured up the idea of a “forward-looking gratuity.”65 
                                                                                                                
  61. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A)–(B) (emphasis added). 
  62. As the D.C. Circuit explains:  
Where the sttaute [sic] does cause great difficulty for a trial judge, a 
difficulty which we hold proved fatal to the conviction in this case, is 
that in addition to the problem of drawing a distinction between one 
definable offense and innocent conduct, where both offenses are charged 
a trial judge must also draw a tripartite distinction between conduct with 
the defined intent to constitute an offense under the bribery section (c), 
conduct with the requisite intent to constitute an offense under the 
gratuity section (g), and conduct with an intent which constitutes no 
offense at all. The trial judge strove manfully—and judicially—make 
[sic] these fine distinctions for the jury. Yet we have found it difficult 
ourselves, with adequate time to reflect and ponder, to understand the 
subtle distinctions made in the written text of the instructions. . . . 
 
We do not fault the District Judge here for his failure to illuminate the 
obscure; it may not be easy under this statute to make the tripartite 
distinction, although we think it is clearly possible to draw instructions 
making sufficiently clear the line between guilt and innocence under 
each subsection of section 201 taken separately. 
United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62, 78–79 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see Brown, The Gratuities 
Offense, supra note 34, at 2061–62. 
  63. PATRICK LEAHY, PUBLIC CORRUPTION PROSECUTION IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 
2007, S. REP. NO. 110-239, at 6 (2007) (stating that the holding of Sun-Diamond “makes the 
[gratuity] statute nearly impossible to differentiate from the federal bribery statute . . . .”); 
Brown, supra note 11, at 1372, 1388. 
  64. See supra notes 27, 61 and accompanying text. 
  65. The “forward-looking gratuity” was first identified in United States v. 
Schaffer, 183 F.3d 833, 841–42 (D.C. Cir. 1999), vacated as moot, United States v. Shaffer 
III, 240 F. 3d 35 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The D.C. Circuit described the gratuities crime as falling 
into three categories based on “temporal focus”: (1) gifts that were a reward for past action; 
(2) gifts that were intended to entice a public official to maintain a position previously 
staked out; and (3) gifts given with the intent to induce a public official to propose, take, or 
shy away from future official act. Schaffer, 183 F.3d at 841–42. The third category of 
gratuities crime was nicknamed “forward-looking gratuities” by commentators. See Brown, 
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The theory of a forward-looking gratuity is that the donor gives a gift to a public 
official because the public official has committed to do a particular act in the 
future; the commitment is in the past, but the act is “to be performed” in the future. 
The gift is a gratuity because it is a reward or tip for the commitment to do the 
act.66 
Yet in this situation, when the donor is giving the gift because of a future 
act, surely the donor is giving the gift not because of past conduct (the 
commitment in words—which is helpful but not conclusive) but because the donor 
wants to ensure that the donee carries through with the act. The donor wants to 
lock in the public official. In other words, the donor intends to influence the 
conduct of the donee. The idea that the donor is grateful for the past verbal 
commitment and rewards it with a gift while remaining indifferent as to whether 
the commitment is kept and the act is done is not persuasive. Rather, in this 
situation, the donor has the intent of influencing the public official to complete the 
act the public official committed to perform.67 This is bribery.68 
The confusion between bribery and gratuities because of particular future 
official acts is exacerbated by the jury instruction on inferring intent, which is an 
instruction given by every district court. That instruction provides: 
Ordinarily, there is no way that a defendant’s state of mind can be 
proved directly, because no one can read another person’s mind and 
tell what that person is thinking. . . . But a defendant’s state of mind 
can be proved indirectly from the surrounding circumstances. 
. . . You may . . . consider the natural and probable results of any 
acts that the defendant knowingly did . . . , and whether it is 
reasonable to conclude that the defendant intended those results.69 
Thus, juries are specifically instructed on their freedom to infer intent. When the 
gratuities prosecution is based on gifting because of a particular future official act, 
the jury will be instructed on its freedom to infer the defendant’s intent to 
influence the donee. 
The conclusion that the crime of gratuities is difficult to distinguish from 
bribery is not a new idea. Commentators have documented the confusion regarding 
the line between the two crimes over the years.70 The only point I would add is my 
                                                                                                                
supra note 1120, at 1380 (describing the Sun-Diamond Court’s treatment of “forward-
looking gratuities”); see generally Klein, supra note 22 (defining the scope of the forward-
looking gratuity in the wake of Sun-Diamond). 
  66. See Klein supra note 22, at 118–19. 
  67. See Eliason, supra note 22, at 980 & n.219. 
  68. See supra notes 45–47, 57–60. 
  69. SIXTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) § 2.08(2)–(4) 
(2001). 
  70. Brown, supra note 11, 1372, 1376; Brown, Putting Watergate Behind Us, 
supra note 34, at 771 (describing the overlap between crimes of bribery and gratuities 
(citing Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Political Bribery and the Intermediate Theory of Politics, 
32 UCLA L. REV. 784, 795–97 (1985)); Klein, supra note 22, at 129; see also Eliason, 
supra note 22, at 960, 985; Weeks, supra note 22, at 132–33. 
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suggestion on how to solve the confusion. I propose eliminating the forward-
looking gratuity altogether and letting that conduct be covered by the crime of 
bribery. 
The best way to eliminate forward-looking gratuities is for Congress to 
amend the statute to delete the language referring to acts “or to be performed.” The 
statutory language in the gratuities subsection would be changed from “[f]or or 
because of an official act performed or to be performed” to “[f]or or because of an 
official act performed.” Deleting the phrase “or to be performed” from the gratuity 
subsections of the statute is a simple and clean way to put an end to the forward-
looking gratuity and the resulting garble between the crimes of bribery and 
gratuities. 
IV. GIFTING BECAUSE OF PAST OFFICIAL ACTS: COVERAGE BY 
GRATUITY CRIME WORKS WELL 
In the situation where a donor transfers a gift to a donee because of an 
official act the donee did in the past, the current gratuities crime works well. The 
donor’s gift can be characterized as a reward, a tip, or a type of thank-you.71 This 
conduct is dangerous at a level that makes its categorization as the crime of 
gratuities appropriate: This conduct is not so innocuous that it should not be 
considered a crime at all, yet the risk of influencing the donee’s conduct is not so 
great as to be characterized as the crime of bribery. 
V. GIFTING BECAUSE OF AN OFFICIAL’S POSITION: NOT COVERED 
BY GRATUITY CRIME BUT SHOULD BE 
A. Not Covered Under Current Gratuities Statute 
Let us imagine a situation where donors give to public officials presents 
that are not because of personal reasons and that are not tied to particular official 
acts. Let’s imagine that the donor is giving the presents to the public official just to 
curry favor, create general goodwill, and to maintain access to the official. One of 
the Supreme Court Justices posed this hypothetical during the oral argument in the 
case:  
QUESTION: Do you say [the gift to the public official] has to be 
because of some particular official act? 
MR. BLOOM [attorney for defendant Sun-Diamond]: . . . [W]e do 
believe that—that the statute calls for a link between a gift on one 
hand and some specific or identifiable official act. 
QUESTION: Specific or identifiable. Well, I mean—I mean, let’s 
say I’m—I’m AT&T, and I just give enormous quantities of money 
to the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission. 
                                                                                                                
  71. See, e.g., United States v. Ring, 628 F. Supp. 2d 195, 205 (D.D.C. 2009) 
(noting that the gratuities charge was sufficient where donor Ring gave sports tickets to 
donee as a “thank you” for help rendered earlier); see also Eliason, supra note 22, at 938, 
945. 
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. . . .  
QUESTION: That doesn’t violate this Act? 
. . . .  
QUESTION: Saying, you know, I'm not asking you to do anything 
in particular. I have no particular case in mind. 
(Laughter.) 
. . . . 
QUESTION: I just—I just want you—just—I just want you to be a 
friend; that’s all. 
(Laughter.) 
MR. BLOOM: I strongly suspect that if I had matters before the 
FCC or before any department, it’s not going to be terribly difficult 
for the prosecutor, especially with the resources of the grand jury, to 
be able to identify matters. 
. . . .  
QUESTION: No, no. Wait. You have to take my hypothetical. 
There is no particular matter that AT&T mentioned to the 
Chairman. It just said, you know, I just love Chairmen of the FCC. 
They are wonderful people. They’re—you know, they could make a 
lot more money elsewhere. I—this is in appreciation of your taking 
all this time out to serve the people. And I—you know, here’s a 
couple of million dollars. 
(Laughter.) 
MR. BLOOM: Well, I strongly suspect that a jury could find that it 
was for an act, if one were identified. But using your hypothetical— 
QUESTION: No particular act. 
MR. BLOOM: I understand, sir. Using your hypothetical, I would 
suspect that that person could be charged under one of the other 
statutes—the salary supplementation statute. It sounds like he’s 
giving the money because of the job and because of his acts as—
pursuant— 
QUESTION: My question was—was not whether he could be 
charged under one of the other statutes. It’s whether he can be 
charged under this statute. 
MR. BLOOM: Right. And our answer is no. 
QUESTION: Is no? 
MR. BLOOM: Is no.72 
                                                                                                                
  72. Transcript of Oral Argument, United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of 
Cal., 526 U.S. 398 (1999) (No. 98-131), 1999 U.S. Trans Lexis 17, at *29–31. 
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Although this colloquy generated plenty of laughter, the Supreme Court 
embraced the argument unanimously, holding that the gratuities crime did not 
apply to gifting because of an official’s position.73 This result is perhaps defensible 
because the language in the gratuities statute always provided that the transfer of 
value had to be given or received because of an official “act.”74   
However, as discussed below, social science research has established that 
gifting to public officials that is not tied to a particular act, but rather is because of 
their positions, is dangerous because it influences the participants and leads to 
biased public officials. 
B. Gifts to Public Officials Because of Their Positions are Dangerous 
Research shows that gifting is dangerous in two basic ways. The 
following Subsections illustrate that gifting is dangerous because: (1) it creates a 
desire for the recipient to reciprocate, and (2) the desire to reciprocate arises from 
the person’s unconscious. 
1. Influence Research: The Urge to Reciprocate 
The primary danger of gifting to public officials because of their position 
is based on social science research on influence. This influence research shows 
that a powerful way to affect how people behave is to trigger the built-in urge to 
reciprocate. The basic human nature rule is, “[W]e should try to repay, in kind, 
what another person has provided us . . . . [W]e are obligated to the future 
repayment of favors, gifts, invitations and the like.”75 
The urge to reciprocate, often called the norm or rule of reciprocity,76 is 
an automatic human response77 based on internalized social norms, possibly with 
an evolutionary basis.78 It is extensive in that all human societies subscribe to it, 
                                                                                                                
  73. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 408, 414 
(1999). 
  74. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (2012). 
  75. ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: SCIENCE AND PRACTICE 19 (5th ed. 2009); 
see also Robert B. Cialdini & Vladas Griskevicius, Social Influence, in ADVANCED SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY: THE STATE OF THE SCIENCE 389 (Roy F. Baumeister & Eli J. Kinkel eds., 
2010) (stating reciprocation rule as “[o]ne should be more willing to comply with a request 
from someone who has previously provided a favor or concession”); LESSIG, supra note 15, 
at 107–15 (describing the federal government as a gift economy based on reciprocity). 
  76. See, e.g., CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 22 (“reciprocity rule”); LESSIG, supra 
note 15, at 109; Jerry M. Burger et al., The Norm of Reciprocity as an Internalized Social 
Norm: Returning Favors Even When No One Finds Out, 4 SOC. INFLUENCE 11, 11–12 
(2009); Mark A. Whatley et al., The Effect of a Favor on Public and Private Compliance: 
How Internalized is the Norm of Reciprocity?, 21 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 251, 251 
(1999). 
  77. CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 1–16. 
  78. Id. at 20 (noting rule for reciprocation is “deeply implanted” in us); LESSIG, 
supra note 15, at 132 (“We don’t need a Sigmund Freud here. We all recognize the drive 
deep in our bones (or, more accurately, our DNA) to reciprocate.” (citing Robert L. Trivers, 
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism, 46 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 35 (1971))); Burger et al., supra 
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and it permeates exchanges of every kind.79 The power of the rule of reciprocity is 
fueled by a double whammy of feelings: We feel bad when we do not reciprocate 
and find ourselves indebted,80 and we feel good when we do reciprocate.81 This 
rule is so powerful that the urge to reciprocate can overwhelm other variables that 
normally determine how a person acts.82 
One of the classic experiments illustrating the power of the rule of 
reciprocity was conducted by Dennis Regan.83 Two subjects were asked to rate 
paintings as part of a study of art appreciation.84 Actually, one of the subjects was 
an undercover associate of experimenter.85 During a break in the rating process, 
the undercover associate left the room for a few minutes.86 In some cases, he 
returned with two bottles of Coke, one for himself and one for the real subject.87 In 
other cases, he returned empty-handed.88 After the paintings were all rated, the 
undercover subject asked the real subject to do him a favor and buy some raffle 
tickets the undercover subject was selling for 25 cents apiece.89 Subjects who had 
received a coke bought twice as many raffle tickets as the subjects who had not 
been given the prior favor.90 On average, subjects who had been given a 10-cent 
drink bought two raffle tickets, amounting to 50 cents or a 500% return on the 10-
cent gift, and some bought as many as seven, amounting to $1.75 or a 1,750% 
return on the 10-cent gift.91 
Researchers have identified more particular characteristics of the rule for 
reciprocity. One feature concerns uninvited first favors: Donees feel compelled to 
reciprocate even for gifts they did not request.92 This response to uninvited gifts 
                                                                                                                
note 76, at 17; Whatley et al., supra note 76, at 252; Jonah Lehrer, Kin and Kind, NEW 
YORKER, Mar. 5, 2012, at 36. 
  79. CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 19 (citing Alvin W. Gouldner, The Norm of 
Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement, 25 AM. SOC. REV. 161, 175 (1960)). 
  80. Id. at 34 (pointing out that negative feelings of indebtedness, including both 
internal discomfort and possibility of external shame, are psychologically costly); LESSIG 
supra note 15, at 109–10 (describing the feeling of moral obligation in the gift economy of 
the federal government). 
  81. Ryan Goei & Franklin J. Boster, The Roles of Obligation and Gratitude in 
Explaining the Effect of Favors on Compliance, 72 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 284, 285 (2005); 
Whatley et al., supra note 76, at 258. 
  82. CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 23–26. 
  83. Dennis T. Regan, Effects of a Favor and Liking on Compliance, 7 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 627 (1971). 
  84. Id. at 631. 
  85. Id. at 630. 
  86. Id. at 631. 
  87. Id. 
  88. Id. 
  89. Id. at 632. 
  90. Id. at 634. 
  91. See CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 24, 35 (describing Regan’s experiment).  
  92. Id. at 31. 
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developed so a person could initiate a relationship without a fear of loss.93 Another 
feature of the rule for reciprocity is unequal exchanges. The rule of reciprocity 
frequently triggers unequal exchanges because to be rid of the uncomfortable 
feeling of indebtedness, people will often agree to a request for a substantially 
larger return gift than one they received.94 Based on this propensity for unequal 
exchanges, donors who intends to exploit this trait of human nature can maximize 
what they receive in return.95 
Another specific feature researchers have identified is that the value of 
the gift is not that important. Even the smallest gifts often make donees feel 
obligated to reciprocate.96 The rule for reciprocity is not affected by anonymity, so 
even if no one will know whether the donee reciprocated, she still will feel an urge 
and will do so.97 And the impact of the rule is enduring, so the desire to repay 
fades over time only when the gift is relatively small.98 
The original research on reciprocity was published by Alvin Gouldner in 
1960.99 Over the years, researchers have replicated the results and further 
investigated the rule of reciprocity.100 The leading authority today on influence 
                                                                                                                
  93. Id. at 30 (“The [reciprocity] rule was established to promote the development 
of reciprocal relationships between individuals so that one person could initiate such a 
relationship without the fear of loss. If the rule is to serve that purpose, then an uninvited 
first favor must have the ability to create an obligation.”). 
  94. Id. at 33–34. 
  95. Id. at 11, 28–31. 
  96. LESSIG, supra note 15, at 111 (“And as economist Michele Dell’Era 
demonstrates, the gifts necessary to make this system of reciprocity work need not be 
large.”); Cialdini & Griskevicius, supra note 75, at 390 (“People often feel obligated to 
reciprocate even the smallest gift.”); Jo-Ann Tsang, Gratitude for Small and Large Favors: 
A Behavioral Test, 2 J. POSITIVE PSYCHOL. 157, 164 (2007) (explaining that although some 
studies show that people report stronger feelings based on larger gifts or favors, value is not 
a significant variable; “when people actually receive a favor from another person, the 
present data suggest that the value of the favor may matter less; rather, ‘it’s the thought that 
counts.’” (citation omitted)); see also Troyen A. Brennan et al., Health Industry Practices 
That Create Conflicts of Interest: A Policy Proposal for Academic Medical Centers, 295 
JAMA 429, 430–31 (2006) (noting the “myth of small gifts” and citing influence research as 
the basis for a proposal that academic medical centers prohibit all gifts from drug and 
medical device companies to physicians). 
  97. See Burger et al., supra note 76, at 17; Whatley et al., supra note 76, at 257–
58 (summarizing that reciprocity effect is not affected by anonymity variable). 
  98. CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 20. 
  99. See id. at 19 (citing Gouldner, supra note 79, 175); Goei & Boster, supra 
note 81, at 284–85. 
100. See generally supra notes 75–98 (indicating relevant studies). Much of the 
significant research was published by Dennis Regan in 1971. See Regan, supra notes 83–91. 
Regan’s research is explained in several publications. See CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 22; 
Thomas M. Susman, Private Ethics, Public Conduct: An Essay on Ethical Lobbying, 
Campaign Contributions, Reciprocity, and the Public Good, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 10, 
15–16 (2008) [hereinafter Susman, Private Ethics] (explaining Regan’s research); Thomas 
M. Susman, Lobbying in the 21st Century—Reciprocity and the Need for Reform, 58 
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generally, and specifically on how the rule of reciprocity influences human 
behavior, is Robert Cialdini.101 
This influence research has not found its way into the criminal law on 
gratuities. The first work was published in 1960, just two years before Congress 
adopted the gratuities crime, and it is not mentioned in the legislative history.102 
When Congress adopted the crime, the data on influencing human behavior was 
not widely known, nor had it been replicated by multiple studies as it has been 
today.103 The courts have not relied on this influence research in the case law on 
gratuities. Two commentators have noted the implications of the influence 
research for government ethics and corruption, but they did not specifically discuss 
implications for the crime of gratuities.104 
The implications of this influence research for the crime of gratuities are 
that all gifting to public officials because of their official position should be 
prohibited. When the characteristics of the rule of reciprocity are applied in the 
context of gifts to public officials because of their official position, the specific 
dangers of these gifts become clear. First, because donees feel compelled to 
reciprocate even uninvited first favors or gifts, gifts to donees compromise the 
ability of the public officials to decide whom they are indebted to, and the choice 
is put in the hands of donors.105 Second, because the rule frequently triggers 
unequal exchanges, a donor who is so inclined can exploit this feature by giving a 
small gift which may well trigger a larger return gift from the donee.106 Third, the 
value of the gift the donor gives is not important; even the smallest gifts will make 
donees feel obligated to reciprocate.107 Donees will feel the urge to reciprocate 
                                                                                                                
ADMIN. L. REV. 737, 747–48 (2006) [hereinafter Susman, Lobbying] (detailing Regan’s 
experiment). 
101. See generally CIALDINI, supra note 75; see also Cialdini & Griskevicius, 
supra note 75, at 385–408. Robert B. Cialdini & Noah J. Goldstein, Social Influence: 
Compliance and Conformity, 55 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 591 (2004); see also Susman, Private 
Ethics, supra note 100, at 16 (citing Cialdini’s book); Susman, Lobbying, supra note 100, at 
748 (discussing Cialdini’s book). 
102. See generally S. REP. NO. 2213 (1962).  
103. See Cialdini & Griskevicius, supra note 75, at 388–91 (2010) (collecting 
numerous studies confirming the power of reciprocity); see also supra note 100.   
104. Cialdini notes that the strength of the reciprocity rule is evident in the 
restrictions on gifts to legislative and judicial officials. CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 27. 
Thomas Susman, an expert on government ethics and lobbying, provides the most detailed 
treatment of the influence research, analyzing the power of reciprocity in the context of 
lobbyists and elected officials. See, e.g., Susman, Private Ethics, supra note 100; Susman, 
Lobbying, note 100. Other writers have mentioned it in passing. ALEXANDER J. FIELD, 
ALTRUISTICALLY INCLINED? THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, EVOLUTIONARY THEORY, AND THE 
ORIGINS OF RECIPROCITY 17–18 (2001); Douglas A. Terry, Don’t Forget about Reciprocal 
Altruism: Critical Review of the Evolutionary Jurisprudence Movement, 34 CONN. L. REV. 
477, 503–04 (2002). 
105. See CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 31. 
106. Id. at 33. 
107. See supra note 96.  
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even if the gesture remains anonymous to all but the donor and donee.108 And 
finally, the feeling of indebtedness that the rule engenders in donees is enduring 
and fades over time for only the most trivial gifts. 
2. The Influence of Reciprocity is Unconscious 
One characteristic of the rule of reciprocity makes it particularly 
dangerous—namely, that persons acting under its influence are not aware of it; the 
influence exerted by the rule of reciprocity is unconscious.109 This is because the 
urge to reciprocate is an ingrained and automatic human response.110 The 
automaticity of the response makes it difficult to control.111 Thus, even if the donor 
and the donee have no plan to abide by the rule for reciprocity, they will likely 
follow it unconsciously.112 This feature of the rule of reciprocity echoes the themes 
of Daniel Kahneman’s research on the automaticity of unconscious thinking 
patterns and responses.113 If they are asked if a gift affected them, donees can say 
no and believe it. As Professor Cialdini explains: 
Regularly, we hear [politicians] proclaiming total independence 
from the feelings of obligation that influence everyone else. 
 . . . Excuse me if I, as a scientist, laugh. . . . Elected and appointed 
officials often see themselves as immune to the rules that apply to 
[the] rest of us . . . . But, to indulge them in this conceit when it 
comes to the rule of reciprocity is not only laughable, it’s 
dangerous.114 
So, the public official can thoroughly and honestly deny that the gifting affected 
his or her conduct, while the evidence shows that it probably did. 
In sum, this influence research demonstrates that gifting to government 
officials is dangerous to equal access in government without any link to a 
particular act and that it is more threatening to the health of democratic governance 
than was previously known. The impact of such gifting is to create an intolerable 
temptation for public officials to act with bias in favor of the donor. And, to 
exacerbate the situation, usually the donee is unaware of this impact. This research 
                                                                                                                
108. See Burger et al., supra note 76, at 17; Whatley et al., supra note 76, at 257–
58. 
109. LESSIG, supra note 15, at 114, 132; see also CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 27–
28; Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing 
Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (2005) (noting that many believe that conflicted 
professionals are consciously and intentionally acting corruptly, whereas “considerable 
research suggests that bias is more frequently the result of motivational processes that are 
unintentional and unconscious”). 
110. LESSIG, supra note 15, at 114, 132.  
111. CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 45. 
112. Id. at 2–10 (discussing automatic human responses that operate as efficient 
mental shortcuts); LESSIG, supra note 15, at 114, 132 (recognizing that the act of 
reciprocating is often an unconscious human function). 
113. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011). 
114. CIALDINI, supra note 75, at 27. 
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supports extending the ban on gifts beyond the one set of donors (lobbyists) and 
donees (members of Congress)115 to all donors and all unelected federal officials. 
Although it was understandable that Congress did not take this research into 
account in 1962, it is indefensible to ignore it now. Based on this research, 
Congress should expand the crime of gratuities to include gifts to public officials 
unconnected to an official act. 
C. Gifting Because of Position Should Be Prohibited 
1. Disclosure Alone is Not an Effective Method of Control 
One approach to control gifting to public officials is to require 
disclosure.116 This regulatory technique is the easiest and most gentle form of 
control. Disclosure is a popular approach these days117 and is used frequently in 
the law.118 Disclosure requirements may be enforced through civil penalties, 
criminal penalties, or both.119 However, disclosure is not an effective method of 
controlling conduct. First, the goals of disclosure are unclear.120 If the theory is 
                                                                                                                
115. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, 2 U.S.C. § 1613 
(2012). 
116. E.g., Susman, Private Ethics, supra note 100, at 20–21 (maximizing 
disclosure is one alternative to reduce impact of reciprocity norm when lobbyists give things 
to elected legislators); Susman, Lobbying, supra note 100, at 750 (insisting in “full and 
immediate disclosure” is the most important step to limit impact of reciprocity norm when 
lobbyists give things to elected officials). 
117. Elizabeth Rosenthal, I Disclose . . . Nothing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2012, at 
SR1 (“[D]isclosure has become the go-to solution for a wide range of problems—from 
unethical campaign financing to rising corporate carbon emissions . . . .”). 
118. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 434(a)(1), (b)(2)(A)–(K), (e)(2)(A)–(B), (e)(3) (2012) 
(requiring national committees of political parties to report receipts and disbursements of 
funds); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(1)(a)(3)(A)–(C), (c)(1)–(2), 7261(b)–(c) (2012) (prescribing 
disclosure requirements for publicly held companies); 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2013) 
(requiring corporations to disclose executive compensation); 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5, 226.17 
(2013) (stating disclosure requirements under The Truth in Lending Act, 12 U.S.C. § 63806, 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1647(c)(5), 1639(I), and 1639(h)); Transparency Reports and Reporting 
of Physician Ownership or Investment Interests, 76 Fed. Reg. 78743 (proposed Dec. 19, 
2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 402 and 403) (proposing regulation that physicians be 
required to divulge financial interests); RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, RULE 
XXVI, H.R. DOC. NO. 111-157, at 995 (2011) (requiring clerk to compile disclosure reports 
filed under the Ethics in Government Act and to make them available to the public); see 
also Julie Powell, An Appetite for Straight A’s, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2012, at A23 (stating 
that New York City restaurants are required to display their sanitary grade from health 
inspectors); Editorial, What College Students Need to Know, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2012, at 
A18 (stating that the 1990 Student Right to Know Act requires colleges and universities that 
receive federal aid to disclose graduation rates and that the 2008 Higher Education 
Opportunity Act requires schools to offer a way for consumers to determine actual costs 
after student aid is taken into account). 
119. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1603 (2012) (imposing disclosure requirements on 
lobbyists); id. § 1606 (2012) (providing civil and criminal penalties for non-compliance). 
120. Rosenthal, supra note 117 (citing Dr. Kevin Weinfurt, Professor of 
Psychiatry, Duke Univ.). 
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that mandated disclosure will deter people from the underlying conduct, we have 
to assume that disclosers feel some shame or aversion.121 Often that assumption is 
not warranted.122 Generally, disclosure laws have not been effective in deterring 
conduct.123 For example, every person with a subprime mortgage signed the 
disclosure statements mandated by the Truth in Lending Act.124 
Alternatively, if the goal of disclosure is to provide more complete 
information that then allows recipients of that information to adjust their conduct, 
the efficacy of disclosure depends on two other assumptions.125 The first 
assumption is that recipients are able to understand the disclosed information and 
its implications.126 But often the information is so complex that we cannot assume 
people can derive meaning from it.127 
The second assumption required for this theory of disclosure to work is 
that recipients can adjust their conduct to respond appropriately to the 
information.128 Yet, often options for response do not exist or are unclear. For 
example, it is clear enough that diners can avoid eating at a restaurant with a low 
sanitary score, but it is less clear how recipients are to respond to the disclosure of 
the fact that their doctor received gifts from particular pharmaceutical 
companies.129 
Finally, disclosure requirements are only effective if they are consistently 
enforced.130 And assuming disclosure requirements are consistently enforced may 
not be warranted. 
                                                                                                                
121. See Floyd Norris, Which Bosses Really Care if Shares Rise?, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 2, 2006, at C1 (stating that many hope that “full disclosure will shame corporate 
boards and bosses into cutting back on excessive pay”). 
122. See Chuck Collins, Disclosure Alone Won’t Stop Runaway CEO Pay, 
LEXINGTON HERALD-LEADER, Apr. 13, 2007, at A13; Daniel Akst, Why Rules Can’t Stop 
Executive Greed, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/05/
business/yourmoney/05cont.html?_r=0. 
123. Rosenthal, supra note 117 (“If recent history serves as a guide, disclosure 
laws . . . do not necessarily . . . prevent the things they were meant to deter.”). 
124. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 226.5, 226.17 (2013).  
125. See Cain et al., supra note 109, at 3 (“For disclosure to be effective, the 
recipient of advice must understand how the conflict of interest has influenced the advisor 
and must be able to correct for that biasing influence.”); James Surowiecki, The Talking 
Cure, NEW YORKER, Dec. 9, 2002, at 54. 
126. Cain et al., supra note 109, at 5. 
127. LESSIG, supra note 15, at 251–58 (providing a four-page list of contributions 
to Congress and noting that while the information seems very important, its meaning is 
unclear); Amitai Etzioni, Disclosure Is Not Enough, AMITAI ETZIONI NOTES (Sept. 24, 2008, 
4:32 PM), http://blog.amitaietzioni.org/2008/09/disclosure-is-not-enough.html; see also 
Brennan et al., supra note 96, at 431 (“[R]ecipients of information who are not experts in a 
particular field often find it impossible to identify a biased opinion that they read or hear 
about that subject.”). 
128. Cain et al., supra note 109, at 3–4. 
129. See, e.g., Brennan et al., supra note 96, at 431. 
130. See Etzioni, supra note 127. 
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More startling is the news that disclosure is not only ineffective but may 
be affirmatively harmful. Disclosure may first harm recipients of the information. 
Recipients of information struggle with “unlearning, ignoring, or suppressing the 
use of knowledge (such as biased advice) even if they are aware that it is 
inaccurate.”131 Moreover, research suggests that disclosure increases rather than 
decreases the information recipients trust in the discloser because the recipients 
view the disclosers as more credible agents.132 Thus, disclosure perversely leads 
recipients to rely on disclosers more rather than less.133 
Another type of harm caused by compelled disclosure is the impact on the 
persons disclosing the information.134 Disclosure is dangerous here in many ways. 
First, disclosure allows persons disclosing to feel freer to engage in underlying 
pernicious conduct. Disclosers feel less personally responsible once their conduct 
is disclosed. This impact is sometime called “moral licensing.”135 After disclosure, 
acting on the conflict seems like fair play; disclosure reduces guilty feelings for 
engaging in conflict-inducing conduct.136 Along the same lines, persons disclosing 
may even feel a sly pride, surmising that the compelled disclosure is evidence that 
they are players.137 
Second, the impact of disclosure on persons disclosing is harmful because 
disclosure operates as an attractive risk-management strategy that allows them to 
reduce their legal liability while continuing the underlying conduct.138 The impact 
of disclosure on the persons disclosing is also harmful because it fuels 
competition. Here, the best example is executive compensation, where required 
disclosure has led to a race in compensation and perks.139 As Warren E. Buffett, 
                                                                                                                
131. Cain et al., supra note 109, at 6.  
132. Id. at 5–6.  
133. See id.; Paul Sullivan, In Investing, Disclosure Only Gets You So Far, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at F6; Surowiecki, supra note 125, at 54. 
134. See Cain et al., supra note 109, at 6–7. 
135. Id. at 7. 
136. Rosenthal, supra note 117 (“Indeed, disclosure has taken on the gestalt of 
confession: Dump the information and be absolved of further moral or legal 
responsibility.”). 
137. Chuck Collins of the Institute for Policy Studies suggests that chief executive 
officers actually like public disclosure of their compensation. Collins asks, “Would you 
discipline an exhibitionist by making them disrobe in the town square?” See Collins, supra 
note 122. 
138. See Cain et al., supra note 109, at 18; Rosenthal, supra note 117 (“Often the 
goal of disclosure is to reduce or eliminate the legal risk . . . . It is so [disclosers] can say, 
‘Hey, we told you so.’” (quoting Dr. Kevin Weinfurt, Professor of Psychiatry, Duke 
Univ.)). 
139. See Akst, supra note 122; Joseph Nocera, Disclosure Won’t Tame C.E.O. 
Pay, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2006, at C1 (stating that if the SEC requires fuller disclosure of 
executive compensation because “whenever [C.E.O.s] discover a fellow C.E.O. is getting 
something they don’t have, they make a grab for it. In other words, as laudable as more 
disclosure is, there is a real possibility that it will make a bad situation worse.”); Norris, 
surpa note 121; cf. Ginia Bellafante, Did You Give the Doorman Enough?, N.Y. TIMES, 
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the chief executive of Berkshire Hathaway, explains, “[t]he unintended 
consequence [of disclosure] could be that it becomes a shopping list for 
C.E.O.’s. . . . Of the seven deadly sins, the one that seems to work more than greed 
is envy.”140 
Finally, disclosure is harmful to society. It has a band-aid-like masking 
effect and so allows society to feel that it is dealing with the danger presented by 
the disclosed conduct. This relieves pressure to take effective action. In other 
words, disclosure allows the status quo to continue and reduces pressure to make 
more important institutional changes.141 Disclosure is also dangerous for society 
because it makes the underlying conduct reported seem fine and normal. As other 
authors have more eloquently put it, disclosure can “legitimize,”142 “normalize,”143 
and “sanitize”144 undesirable conduct. If disclosure does not entirely normalize the 
conduct, it surely trivializes the conduct. In sum, disclosure alone, without 
prohibition, is not positive or even benign but is affirmatively harmful. 
When the compelled-disclosure approach is examined specifically in the 
context of gifting, the inadequacies and positive harms of disclosure are evident. 
Current law requires disclosure of some gifts made to officials of the executive,145 
legislative,146 and judicial branches.147 An assumption of this approach is that 
recipients of the disclosed information (the public) on gifts would likely have the 
ability to understand it, at least on a basic level. This information will not be as 
complex as, for example, data on corporate finance. The public may not 
                                                                                                                
Dec. 25, 2011, at MB1 (examining how people evaluate their conduct by comparison to 
others’ conduct in tipping doormen at the holidays). 
140. See Norris, surpa note 121 (quoting Warren E. Buffett, chief executive of 
Berkshire Hathaway). 
141. See Cain et al., supra note 109, at 3; Rosenthal, supra note 117; Surowiecki, 
supra note 125, at 54. 
142. KRISTEN M. LORD, THE PERILS AND PROMISE OF GLOBAL TRANSPARENCY: 
WHY THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION MAY NOT LEAD TO SECURITY, DEMOCRACY, OR PEACE 
3 (2006). 
143. LESSIG, supra note 15, at 257–58; see also Weeks, supra, note 22, at 143 
(stating that disclosure of campaign contributions to Congress was ineffective and “may 
well have simply institutionalized the quid pro quo as the normal and, at least by 
implication, the accepted manner by which legislation is enacted”); Rosenthal, supra note 
117. 
144. See Brennan et al., supra note 96, at 431. 
145. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, 5 U.S.C. app. 4 § 102(a)(2)(A) (2012); 5 
C.F.R. § 2634.304 (2013). 
146. 5 U.S.C. app. 4 §§ 101–111 (2012), also adopted as THE STANDING RULES OF 
THE SENATE, SENATE MANUAL, S. DOC. NO. 112-1, Rs. XXXIV, XLI(1) (2012), available at 
http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RulesOfSenateHome. 
147. GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 620.50, available at http://www.uscourts.
gov/Viewer.aspx?doc=/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/conduct/Vol02C-Ch06.pdf (“Disclosure 
Requirements: Judicial officers and employees subject to the Ethics in Government Act of 
1978 and the instructions of the Financial Disclosure Committee of the Judicial Conference 
of the United States must comply with the Act and the instructions in disclosing gifts.”). 
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understand all the more subtle implications of the information, but they will 
probably not be overcome by complexity.148 This assumption likely holds true. 
The second assumption, that recipients can adjust their conduct to 
respond to the information, is more of a problem. In the case of unelected public 
officials, it is unclear how recipients can adjust conduct once gifting information is 
disclosed. For example, how are we to respond to the disclosure of gifts received 
by Supreme Court Justices?149 And even if recipients have a way to respond to the 
gifting information, as noted above, research demonstrates that people have trouble 
adjusting their conduct appropriately.150 Based in part on this research, the medical 
education field has concluded that disclosure of gifts to physicians from medical 
device companies is ineffective and has proposed instead that all gifts to 
physicians from medical device companies be prohibited.151 
Disclosure exacerbates the underlying problem in the context of gifting. 
One example is provided by Senator Saxby Chambliss.152 When the Senate was 
considering limiting lawmakers’ use of corporate jets in 2006, Senator Chambliss 
opposed the limits. Rather than limit the conduct, he said, the simple answer was 
to require disclosure of corporate jet use.153 The reason he took this position then 
became clear: Senator Chambliss used corporate jets more than most other 
senators.154 His support of the disclosure approach illustrates harmful aspects of 
requiring disclosure. Disclosers feel less guilty and freed up to continue the 
practice, and society imagines that the problem has been handled so no further 
change to the status quo is necessary.155 Treating the conduct with disclosure 
avoids more aversive action, like prohibition. 
Another example of the positive harm caused by compelled disclosure of 
gifts is revealed by a prosecutor’s remarks on the prosecution of Senator Ted 
Stevens. Senator Stevens was prosecuted and found guilty on seven counts of lying 
                                                                                                                
148. See Richard A. Serrano & David G. Savage, Justice Thomas Reports Wealth 
of Gifts, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2004, at A1 (recounting gifts received and reported by Justice 
Clarence Thomas between 1998 and 2003, including a $19,000 Bible from a Republican 
donor, $15,000 for a Lincoln bust from the American Enterprise Institute, $5,000 in cash 
from a mobile home enthusiast, $1,200 in tires from a trucking executive, $1,200 in 
batteries from former law clerks, and an $800 jacket from the Daytona 500 auto race). 
149. See id. 
150. Cain et al., supra note 109, at 5–6. 
151. Brennan et al., supra note 96, at 431 (proposing that academic medical 
centers prohibit all gifts from drug and medical device companies to physicians). 
152. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Fight Looms on Lawmakers’ Use of Corporate Jets, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2006, at A19. 
153. Id.  
154. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Fight Looms on Lawmakers’ Use of Corporate Jets, 
N.Y. TIMES (March 8, 2006), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/
08/08lobby.html (issuing a March 13, 2006 amendment to the March 8, 2006 article stating 
that: Senator Chambliss ranked third among current senators who from 2001 to 2005 
reimbursed companies for jet travel). 
155. See supra notes 122–23, 135–38, 141–44 and accompanying text.  
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to the government for not reporting the value of gifts on a disclosure form.156 
Because of government errors, this verdict was set aside and no judgment of 
conviction was entered.157 A prosecutor later characterized the case as “piddly,” 
not one of the “crimes of the century. . . . It was a forms case—a guy got his 
financial disclosure forms wrong.”158 Thus, the treatment of gifting as a target for 
disclosure trivialized the danger of the underlying gifting conduct. 
2. Gifting Because of Position is Not Currently Prohibited  
a. Ethics Rules 
Under current law, gifts to public officials are regulated by various ethics 
laws. This is the regulatory structure the Court referred to in Sun-Diamond.159 As 
Kathleen Clark has noted, this regulatory structure is complicated; it includes 
statutes, regulations, and executive orders, and the laws are so complex that a 
cottage industry has developed around them.160 These rules begin with a statute, 
§ 7353, that generally prohibits gifts to all federal employees from certain 
interested donors.161 The statute then authorizes each branch of government to 
issue regulations establishing exceptions.162 The executive, legislative, and judicial 
branches have all adopted their own regulations that prohibit or authorize gifts in 
various circumstances.163 Within the executive branch, the maze of regulations is 
even more convoluted because each agency has adopted its own set of 
regulations.164 Aside from these rules based on § 7353, Congress has adopted 
                                                                                                                
156. Senator Stevens was prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1)–(2). In re: 
Contempt Finding in United States v. Stevens, William M. Welch and Brenda K. Morris, 
Appellants, United States v. Stevens, 663 F.3d 1270, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (No. 10-5372), 
2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 24431, at *2. 
157. The verdict was set aside because the government violated the Constitution 
in failing to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense. Id.  
158. Charlie Savage, Elite Unit’s Problems Pose Test for Attorney General, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 8, 2009, at A20 (quoting a former federal prosecutor with the public integrity 
unit). 
159. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 409–10 
(1999). 
160. Clark, supra note 15, at 64–67. 
161. 5 U.S.C. § 7353 (2012). 
162. Id. § 7353(b)(1). 
163. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.201–.205 (2013) (regulating the executive branch); THE 
STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, SENATE MANUAL, S. DOC. NO. 112-1, R. XXXV (2012) 
(regulating Senators and Senate employees); THE RULES OF THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE RULES MANUAL, H.R. DOC. NO. 111-157, R. XXV (2012) 
(regulating Representatives and House employees); GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY Canon 4D4 
§ 620 (regulating federal judges). 
164. See Agency Supplemental Regulations, U.S. OFF. GOV’T ETHICS, 
http://www.oge.gov/Laws-and-Regulations/Agency-Supplemental-Regulations/Agency-Sup
plemental-Regulations/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013) (listing 48 sets of supplemental agency 
regulations found in various parts of Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations). 
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several miscellaneous statutes.165 And on top of these statutes, in 2007, in the wake 
of the Abramoff scandal, Congress adopted other statutes that prohibit certain 
gifts.166 
These ethics laws do not prohibit gifts from all donors to all public 
officials because of their official positions. As Professor Clark points out, in the 
main statute, all donees are covered but only certain categories of donors are 
covered.167 This approach of applying the prohibition based on the identity of the 
donor is called the prohibited source approach.168 Another statute also prohibits 
gifts but only from donors who are foreign governments.169 Two additional statutes 
prohibit gifts based on the particular type of donees, specifically government 
employees involved in the procurement process170 and meat inspectors.171 The 
most recently adopted statute, from 2007, prohibits gifts only from particular 
donors (registered lobbyists) to particular public officials (persons in the legislative 
branch).172 This statute limits the prohibition on gifts using both the prohibited 
source and prohibited donee approaches. 
These ethics prohibitions are pieces of a puzzle that do not cover all gifts 
that donors give to donees because of the officials’ positions.173 The morass of 
ethics rules is so difficult to understand, the law is almost unknowable, and the 
patchwork character of the law leads to overlaps and gaps174 and other curious 
features.175  
                                                                                                                
165. See Clark, supra note 15, at 83 n.133, 84 nn.135 & 139 (citing 5 
U.S.C. § 7342 (2012); 41 U.S.C. § 423(p)(3)(A) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 622 (2012)). 
166. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1613 (2012). 
167. See Clark, supra note 15, at 82–83 (discussing 5 U.S.C. § 7353(a)(1)–(2) 
(2012)). 
168. E.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 411 
(quoting 5 C.F.R. § 2635.203(d)(4) (1999) as forbidding gifts from a “prohibited source”). 
169. 5 U.S.C. § 7342. 
170. 41 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (2012). 
171. 21 U.S.C. § 622 (2012). 
172. 2 U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1613 (2012). 
173. See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.202(a)(2) (2013) (prohibiting federal employees in the 
executive branch from soliciting or accepting a gift “[g]iven because of the employee’s 
official position”). The Supreme Court described this provision as one that “makes unlawful 
approximately (if not precisely)” the gifts the government argued for (and lost on) in Sun-
Diamond, 526 U.S. at 411. The regulations, however, after stating this general rule, go on to 
establish many qualifications and exceptions. 5 C.F.R. § 2635.203 (2013) (“Definitions”); 
Id. § 2635.204 (2013) (“Exceptions”). 
174. See generally Clark, supra note 15, at 80–84 (identifying various 
redundancies and gaps in the ethics rules). 
175. The most curious feature is an executive branch regulation stating: 
“Relationship to illegal gratuities statute. Unless accepted in violation of paragraph (c)(1) of 
this section, a gift accepted under the standards set forth in this subpart shall not constitute 
an illegal gratuity otherwise prohibited by 18 U.S.C. 201(c)(1)(B).” 5 C.F.R. § 2635.202(b). 
As the Court noted in Sun-Diamond, “We are unaware of any law empowering [the Office 
of Government Ethics] to decriminalize acts prohibited by Title 18 of the United States 
Code.” 526 U.S. at 411. 
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At any rate, if the ethics rules do cover a particular kind of gifting, that 
coverage is not a persuasive reason to forego criminalizing that conduct. Ethics 
prohibitions do not make criminal prohibitions unnecessary. In view of how likely 
it is that such gifts will influence the public official and lead to bias, these ethics 
prohibitions alone are not adequate. Criminal prohibitions are warranted; Congress 
should make such gifts a crime. Richard E. Myers II has persuasively argued that 
using excessive numbers of detailed regulations for punishment is an undesirable 
approach to controlling conduct and that we should rather rely on crimes to “map 
our moral intuitions.”176 Gifts to public officials because of their positions should 
be controlled by amending the gratuity statute to criminalize them. 
b. Criminal Law 
The most recently adopted statute, from 2007, prohibits gifts only from 
particular donors (registered lobbyists) to particular public officials (persons in the 
legislative branch).177 These statutes limit the prohibition on gifts using both the 
prohibited source and prohibited donee approaches.178 
If disclosure is required by ethics laws, lying or failing to disclose may be 
treated as a crime under 18 U.S.C. § 1001—a federal criminal statute that prohibits 
lying to and failing to disclose information to the government.179 In 2011, two 
high-profile prosecutions of public officials, who received things of value from 
private donors because of their official positions, ended. The defendants were 
Senator Ted Stevens180 and David Safavian.181 Senator Stevens received gifts 
including approximately $250,000 worth of goods and services to upgrade his 
house in Alaska.182 David Safavian, who was at the time Chief of Staff for the 
Administrator of the Government Services Administration, received a golf junket 
to Scotland and England,183 which included, inter alia: a private charter flight,184 
golf fees costing more than $300 per round,185 and hotel rooms at around $500 per 
night.186 
These two public officials were prosecuted not for receiving gifts because 
of their positions, but for lying about them to the government. Senator Stevens was 
found guilty by a jury on seven counts of making a false statement to the 
                                                                                                                
176. Myers, supra note 11, at 1872–73. 
177. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1606, 1613. 
178. See id. 
179. See 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a), (c) (2012). 
180. See In re Contempt Finding in United States v. Stevens, 663 F.3d 1270, 1271 
(D.C. Cir. 2011). 
181. See United States v. Safavian, 649 F.3d 688, 689 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
182. Neil A. Lewis, Dismissal for Stevens, but Question on ‘Innocent,’ N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at A14. 
183. United States v. Safavian, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2009), aff’d, 649 
F.3d 688 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
184. Id. at 4, 21. 
185. Id. at 22. 
186. Id. at 23. 
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government, although the verdict was later set aside.187 David Safavian was found 
guilty by a jury on four counts of lying to the government;188 his convictions were 
affirmed.189 
In both Stevens and Safavian, the defendants’ conduct underlying the 
false statements involved receiving things of value for or because of their official 
position. But they were not prosecuted for that, likely because the Sun-Diamond 
interpretation of the gratuities statute made that theory of prosecution unavailable. 
Instead, the defendants were prosecuted for lying to government about the things 
of value they received. 
This approach has drawbacks. These two pieces of conduct, receiving 
gifts because of an official position and lying to the government, are distinct pieces 
of criminal conduct with distinct harms. If defendants did both, they should face 
liability for both. 
Moreover, prosecuting public officials for lying to the government but not 
for underlying conduct that led to the lies diminishes the legitimacy and credibility 
of federal criminal law. These cases were pretextual prosecutions to the extent that 
the defendants were suspected of committing a crime and were investigated based 
on some conduct (accepting the things of value) and then prosecuted based on 
unrelated conduct (lying to the government).190 This has been dubbed the Al 
Capone approach to criminal prosecution.191 Daniel Richman and William Stuntz 
have identified the government argument in support of the Al Capone approach192 
and chronicled how this argument wins in courts and is tolerated in the academic 
literature.193 Professors Richman and Stuntz criticize this approach because it 
muddies the signals a criminal prosecution sends to society, and the justice system 
loses credibility when the charges that motivate a prosecution do not coincide with 
                                                                                                                
187. Senator Stevens was found guilty by a jury on seven counts of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001 for not reporting the value of gifts on a campaign disclosure form. See In re 
Contempt Finding in United States v. Stevens, 663 F.3d 1270, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011); 
Lewis, supra note 182 (stating that Mr. Stevens was convicted on seven counts). The verdict 
was set aside because the government violated the Constitution in failing to disclose 
exculpatory evidence to the defense. See United States v. Stevens, No. 08-cr-231(EGS), 
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39046, at *1–2 (D.D.C. April 7, 2009). 
188. Safavian, 644 F. Supp. 2d at 7. The four counts included three counts of 
making false statements under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(1) (2012) and one count of obstruction 
of justice under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (2012). Id. 
189. United States v. Safavian, 649 F.3d 688, 694 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
190. See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay 
on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 584–85 
(2005). 
191. See Harry Litman, Pretextual Prosecution, 92 GEO. L.J. 1135, 1182 (2004); 
Richman & Stuntz, supra note 190, at 584–85. 
192. Richman & Stuntz, supra note 190, at 584 (“The government responds 
that . . . false statements . . . or whatever the charged offense . . . is a legitimate crime, 
something for which any ordinary citizen might be prosecuted and punished if guilty. Surely 
the Al Capones of the world should not be immune from punishment for the small crimes 
they commit by virtue of their larger crimes.”). 
193. Id. at 584–85. 
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the charges on which defendants are convicted.194 That is exactly the situation here 
in using false statements to the government as the basis for prosecution instead of 
using the gratuities conduct. This approach to prosecution is not healthy for federal 
criminal law.195 
3. Gifting Because of Position Should Be Prohibited as a Crime by Amending the 
Gratuity Statute to Cover It 
Influence research indicates that when donors transfer value to donees 
because of the public officials’ positions, the public officials will be influenced to 
reciprocate.196 Controlling such gifts through disclosure alone is not an adequate 
response, and ethics rules and current criminal laws do not prohibit this conduct 
comprehensively and clearly. Congress should amend the gratuities statute to 
prohibit gifting to public officials because of their positions. Before going ahead 
with the specifics, however, we need to address the dangers of overcriminalization. 
D. Possible Limits to Avoid Overcriminalization 
One possible critique of my proposal to criminalize gifts based on an 
official’s position is that it may overcriminalize the behavior. The drawbacks of 
overcriminalization in the context of gratuities have been well articulated by 
George Brown.197 They include concerns about vagueness, prosecutorial 
discretion, criminalization of ethics rules, and criminalization of innocent 
conduct.198 Other commentators have recognized the legitimate dangers of 
overcriminalization in general.199 These concerns must be addressed if the 
gratuities crime is expanded. 
1. Ways to Avoid Overcriminalization: Possible Solutions 
Several methods to limit the gratuities crime to avoid overcriminalization 
have been suggested or adopted. One is to limit the crime to certain types of 
donors or donees. An example of this approach is the criminal statute adopted after 
the Abramoff scandal in 2007 that prohibits gifts from registered lobbyists to 
certain officials in the executive branch.200 Professor Brown, who endorses 
expanding the crime of gratuities, has explored this approach to criminalizing 
gratuities.201 The downside of this method of limiting the crime is that it 
                                                                                                                
194. Id. at 586–87. 
195. See Myers, supra note 11, at 1855, 1864 (stating that crime is not an 
appropriate subject for elite and expert views but instead should reflect broadly held moral 
commitments). But see Litman, supra note 191, at 1182 (arguing that objections in principle 
to the Al Capone approach fail; that the approach in actual practice is generally justified; 
and that the considerations driving the approach are legitimate and sensible). 
196. See supra Part V.B.  
197. Brown, supra note 11, at 1372. 
198. See id. at 1387–94.  
199. Myers, supra note 11, at 1865–66. 
200. See Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007, 2 U.S.C. 
§§ 1606, 1613 (2012). 
201. See Brown, supra note 11, at 1413. 
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constitutes a piecemeal approach to the problem that is not broad enough to handle 
all the dangers of gifting. 
A second approach to limit the dangers of overcriminalization is to 
include in the statute some minimum amount of value that the thing given to the 
public official must reach. For example, the statute could prohibit gifts to public 
officials because of their positions with a value over $50 or $100. Federal criminal 
law has occasionally used this approach to set floors for what constitutes criminal 
behavior.202 This is not the best limiting technique for gratuities because, as 
discussed above, influence research shows that even small gifts can trigger the 
urge to reciprocate.203 
An unusual approach to limiting the crime is evidenced in a 2011 bill that 
was before the Senate.204 This bill proposed to reverse the Sun-Diamond result—
that gifts based on an official’s position are not criminal—and extend the gratuities 
crime to cover all benefits given to public officials because of their position.205 The 
bill’s proposal was consistent with the proposal in this Article. However, the 
Senate’s bill went on to carve out from the amended crime all gifts given or 
accepted in conformity with the ethics rules.206 In effect, this was a safe harbor 
from criminal liability based on the complex ethics rules and regulations discussed 
above.207 This definition of the crime as depending on whether the defendant 
complied with the ethics rules has the drawback of making the criminal liability 
line impossible to understand.208 This is not the best approach for criminal law, 
which should strive for clarity in charting society’s broad moral conclusions.209 
2. My Solution: Limit the Crime the Old-Fashioned Way, with a Mens Rea 
Element 
The best way to limit the law to avoid overcriminalization is for Congress 
to add mens rea terms to the statute.210 This is the criminal law’s traditional way of 
avoiding overcriminalization. Before proposing a particular mens rea for 
gratuities, this Article examines what the mens rea is now. Nowhere have courts or 
commentators provided a comprehensive analysis of the mens rea for the crime of 
gratuities. 
                                                                                                                
202. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 666 (2012). 
203. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
204. See Public Corruption Prosecution Improvements Act, S. 401, 112th Cong. 
(as introduced in the Senate, Feb. 17, 2011). The Senate did not take action and the 
proposed 2011 bill died. 
205. Id. § 12. 
206. Id. § 12(a)(4). 
207. PATRICK LEAHY, PROPOSED PUBLIC CORRUPTION PROSECUTION 
IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 2007, S. REP. NO. 110-239, at 6 (2007) (characterizing the carve-out 
as a “safe harbor”). 
208. See Clark, supra note 15, at 64–67. 
209. See Myers, supra note 11, at 1864, 1867, 1877–78. 
210. See id. at 1873–74. 
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a. The Mens Rea Currently 
The mens rea for gratuities is not easily defined. The statute has no mens 
rea term,211 but Congress sometimes writes empty criminal statutes and leaves the 
mens rea to the courts.212 The Supreme Court holds that the requirement of mens 
rea is a background presumption, and the courts will generally infer mens rea 
when the statute is empty to avoid strict liability crimes.213 The following Subpart 
starts with cases from the Supreme Court and the District of Columbia Circuit, 
then looks at the cases from other circuits decided after Sun-Diamond, and finally 
examines cases from other circuits decided before Sun-Diamond. 
i. The Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit 
The Supreme Court has considered the crime twice. Both of these cases 
arose in the D.C. Circuit and are best understood against the background of all the 
D.C. Circuit’s gratuities case law. The D.C. Circuit case law is also important on 
its own because it is where most gratuities cases arise.214 
In the first Supreme Court case, United States v. Brewster, the defendant 
donee was a former U.S. Senator. 215 He was indicted on four counts of bribery and 
one count of gratuities for soliciting and taking money in return for his actions on 
postal rate legislation when he was in the Senate.216 The defendant moved to 
dismiss the indictment because the prosecution would require examination of his 
legislative behavior and would run afoul of the Speech or Debate Clause.217 
Although the Speech and Debate Clause protects legislators from investigations 
regarding their official business, the Supreme Court held in 1972 that the 
prosecution could proceed because taking bribes is not part of the legislative 
                                                                                                                
211. See 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (2012). This statute omits any of the usual mens 
rea terms like purposefully, intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, negligently, willfully, or 
corruptly. Id. 
212. See, e.g., Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977, 18 
U.S.C. § 2251(a) (2012); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012) (showing that the firearms crime 
includes no mens rea in the statute, but courts have imposed a mes rea of “knowingly”); 
Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012) (showing that although the Hobbs Act includes no 
mens rea in the statute, courts have read in a mens rea element). Recently, Justice Scalia 
described and criticized Congress’s approach to drafting criminal statutes: 
We face a Congress that puts forth an ever-increasing volume of laws in 
general, and of criminal laws in particular. It should be no surprise that 
as the volume increases, so do the number of imprecise laws. . . . Fuzzy, 
leave-the-details-to-be-sorted-out-by-the-courts legislation is attractive 
to the Congressman who wants credit for addressing a national problem 
but does not have the time (or perhaps the votes) to grapple with the 
nitty-gritty. In the field of criminal law, at least, it is time to call a halt. 
Sykes v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2267, 2288 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
213. See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 607 & n.3 (1994); Morissette v. 
United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250–56 (1952). 
214. See generally Eliason, supra note 22. 
215. 408 U.S. 501, 502 (1972). 
216. Id. 
217. Id. at 503.  
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process.218 Most of the decision focused on the bribery counts, but in one 
paragraph addressing the gratuity count, the Court stated: 
[I]t is, once again, unnecessary to inquire into the [defendant’s] act or its 
motivation. To sustain a conviction it is necessary to show that 
[defendant] solicited, received, or agreed to receive, money with 
knowledge that the donor was paying him compensation for an official 
act. Inquiry into the legislative performance itself is not necessary; 
evidence of the [defendant’s] knowledge of the alleged briber’s illicit 
reasons for paying the money is sufficient to carry the case to the jury.219 
This language means that to be liable for gratuities, a donee must have knowledge 
that the donor gave him the gift for or because of an official act; in other words, 
the donee must have a mens rea of knowledge of the facts.220 
After the Supreme Court held that the Brewster prosecution could 
continue,221 the defendant went to trial.222 The jury instructions stated that the 
defendant official had to have received the gifts “willfully and knowingly rather 
than by mistake or accident,” and further stated that the government did not have 
to prove “any corrupt intent.”223 The defendant was convicted on three counts of 
gratuities. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit found these instructions to be in error and 
reversed the convictions because the instructions did not clearly distinguish among 
bribery, gratuity, and no crime with indisputable clarity.224 
This case does not further the mens rea analysis. The D.C. Circuit first 
quotes the Supreme Court language reprinted above stating that for a gratuities 
conviction, the donee must have knowledge that the gift was for or because of an 
official act.225 But the circuit court then holds that a gratuities conviction based on 
instructions requiring the defendant to act “willfully and knowingly” was error for 
other reasons.226 The court also makes a number of curious random statements 
about mens rea. The court identifies the “otherwise clause” of the statute as the 
                                                                                                                
218. Id. at 525–26.  
219. Id. at 527. 
220. The strength of Brewster is undermined somewhat because mens rea was not 
the main issue; moreover, throughout the decision, the Court focused on the crime of 
bribery and often discussed the crimes of bribery and gratuities without distinguishing them. 
See, e.g., id. at 502 (“This direct appeal from the District Court presents the question 
whether a Member of Congress may be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(c)(1), 201(g), 
for accepting a bribe in exchange for a promise relating to an official act.”). The Court also 
stated that “[t]he counts of the indictment involved in the instant case were based on 18 
U.S.C. § 201, a bribery statute . . . . Subsections (c)(1) and (g) prohibit the accepting of a 
bribe in return for being influenced in or performing an official act.” Id. at 505–06. When 
this decision was handed down in 1972, the gratuities crime had already been codified in 18 
U.S.C. § 201(g) (2012). 
221. Id. at 528–29.  
222. See generally United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1974).  
223. Id. at 80. 
224. Id. at 67–68, 81–82. 
225. Id. at 76. 
226. Id. at 81–83. 
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basis for mens rea.227 The court notes that “general criminal intent” is required.228 
After noting that a donee must have knowledge that the donor gave the gift for or 
because of an official act, the court recharacterizes this as “a certain guilty 
knowledge.”229 Overall, the court’s statements and holding are curious and 
inconsistent. 
In 1982, in United States v. Campbell, the D.C. Circuit handed down an 
opinion that not only failed to clarify the mens rea for gratuities but affirmatively 
injected new confusion.230 The government charged a trucking company and a 
judge of the D.C. Superior Court with various political corruption crimes, and the 
jury convicted each defendant on one count of gratuities.231 The gratuities count 
charged that the construction company, which had received hundreds of tickets for 
weight violations, gave the judge adjudicating the tickets help with moving his 
household goods.232 Three times the D.C. Circuit describes the jury instructions as 
requiring that defendants have a mens rea of “knowingly and willfully.”233 But the 
problem is that in concluding the discussion, the Court affirms the convictions and 
announces, “[i]t was more than sufficient in this case for the trial court to require 
that the alleged gratuities be given and received ‘knowingly and willingly’ and ‘for 
or because of an official act.’”234 In this statement, the court used the word 
“willingly” rather than the word “willfully.” 
The court did not offer any explanation or authority, so it is unclear what 
to make of this change in words. The switch might not have mattered, but 
“willingly” is the term that subsequent decisions picked up and wove into the 
gratuities law of the D.C. Circuit.235 Likely, the switch in words was a typo. The 
word “willingly” is generally not used in federal criminal law and has no 
established meaning.236 Congress has not used the term in any regularly prosecuted 
criminal statute.237 Aside from the gratuities cases in the D.C. Circuit, the term 
“willingly” has shown up in the case law only rarely,238 and in all the cases it was 
                                                                                                                
227. Id. at 71. 
228. Id. at 82. 
229. Id. 
230. See 684 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
231. Id. at 144–45. 
232. Id. at 144. 
233. See id. at 147–48. 
234. Id. at 150. 
235. See, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 138 F.3d 961, 965–
67 (D.C. Cir. 1998), aff’d, 526 U.S. 398 (1999); United States v. Gatling, 96 F.3d 1511, 
1522 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (citing United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 149–50 (D.C. Cir. 
1982)). 
236. See infra notes 237–40 and accompanying text.  
237. I know of no statute where the term was used, but because there are at least 
4,000 federal crimes spread throughout many titles, I cannot say Congress has never used it. 
See generally John S. Baker, Jr., Measuring the Explosive Growth of Federal Crime 
Legislation, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Oct. 1, 2004), http://www.fed-soc.org/publications/detail/
measuring-the-explosive-growth-of-federal-crime-legislation. 
238. See United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 174 (3d Cir. 2008); United 
States v. Dearing, 504 F.3d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. George, 386 F.3d 383, 
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likely a mistake.239 Outside case law, the term “willingly” sometimes turns up, but 
in all these sources, when the authority is checked, the writer merely substituted 
the word “willingly” for “willfully.”240 
Thus, after using the term willfully three times, the D.C. Circuit just made 
a mistake in substituting the term willingly for willfully in the one sentence at the 
end of its opinion. The D.C. Circuit’s introduction of the term willingly in 
Campbell and its use in succeeding cases does not illuminate but confuses the 
mens rea for gratuities.241 
The second time the Supreme Court considered the crime of gratuities 
was in 1999 in United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California.242 The 
defendant was a trade association for growers of raisins, figs, walnuts, prunes, and 
hazelnuts. It was charged with gratuities for giving gifts to the Secretary of 
Agriculture, Mike Espy,243 including, tickets to the U.S. Open tennis tournament, 
luggage, meals, a framed print, and a crystal bowl.244 The defendant was convicted 
                                                                                                                
397 (2d Cir. 2004); United States v. Osborne, 68 F.3d 94, 100 (5th Cir. 1995); United States 
v. Soriano, 880 F.2d 192, 198 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v. Crop Growers Corp., 954 F. 
Supp. 335, 348 n.14 (D.D.C. 1997). 
239. In Hoffecker, 530 F.3d at 174, the court states that the district court gave an 
instruction on “willingly,” but later in the case, the circuit court states at least five times that 
the instructions used the term “willfully” and quotes the instructions using that word. See id. 
at 177, 181–82. In Osborne, 68 F.3d at 100 n.18, the authority the court cites for “willingly” 
is 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) (2012) and United States v. Jackson, 978 F.2d 903, 910 (5th Cir. 
1992), but both of those sources use the term “willfully.” In two of the cases, the court’s 
main instruction used the word “willingly,” but the court defined the term “willfully.” See 
Dearing, 504 F.3d at 902; George, 386 F.3d at 397. In Crop Growers Corp., 954 F. Supp. at 
348 n.14, the court uses the word “willingly” for the aiding and abetting statute, which uses 
the term “willfully.” Finally, in Soriano, 880 F.2d at 198, the court states that the indictment 
uses “willingly” when an earlier quote of the indictment shows it used the term “willfully.” 
240. See, e.g., 1A KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND 
INSTRUCTIONS § 19:02 (6th ed. 2008) (stating that in Dixon v. United States, 548 U.S. 1 
(2006), the issue was whether the defendant acted “willingly,” but the term used in both the 
statute (18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012)) and the case is “willfully”); 2B KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET 
AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 61.05 (5th ed. 2000) (stating that in 
United States v. Anaya, 509 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla. 1980), the issue was whether defendants 
“willingly” transported Cuban nationals, but the term used in both the statute (18 U.S.C. 
§ 1324 (2012)) and the case was “willfully”). 
241. In addition, reconciling the D.C. Circuit’s conclusions in United States v. 
Campbell, 684 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and United States v. Brewster, 506 F.2d 62 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974), is not easy. In 1974, the Brewster court concluded that instructions requiring the 
defendant to have a mens rea element of willfully and knowingly were error because of a 
blurry tripartite distinction. See 506 F.2d at 78–81. But in Campbell in 1982, instructions 
that required the defendant to have a mens rea element of knowingly and willfully/willingly 
were deemed more than sufficient to meet the plain error standard. See 684 F.2d at 150. 
242. 526 U.S. 398 (1999). 
243. Id. at 400–01. 
244. Id. at 401. The indictment had two gratuities counts. Count I alleged that 
Sun-Diamond gave Secretary of Agriculture Espy tickets to the 1993 U.S. Open Tennis 
Tournament worth $2,295, luggage worth $2,427, meals worth $665, and a framed print and 
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at trial, but the D.C. Circuit reversed because the instructions allowed the jury to 
convict Sun-Diamond based on gifts given because of the official’s position rather 
than the gifts being linked a particular act. The government appealed, and the 
Supreme Court agreed with the D.C. Circuit: The government could not convict 
the defendant donor for gratuities based on giving things to a public official 
because of the official’s position but rather had to prove that the donor’s gifts were 
tied to a particular official act.245 
On mens rea, the jury instructions required the defendant to give the gifts 
to the federal official “knowingly and willingly.”246 The Supreme Court does not 
discuss these mens rea terms because it finds the instructions erroneous on other 
grounds, i.e., their reference to the donee’s official position rather than to a 
particular official act.247 In the course of the opinion, the Court makes one 
comment that arguably refers to the mens rea for gratuities. The Court states that 
the main difference between the crime of bribery and gratuities is the “intent 
element”: Bribery requires an intent to influence the public official whereas the 
gratuities crime “requires only that the gratuity be given . . . ‘for or because of’ an 
official act.”248 This statement is surely correct, but it does not tell us anything 
about mens rea—about whether the donor and donee must intend that the gift be 
because of an official act, or know that the gift is because of an official act, or 
know that gifting because of an official act is illegal. Reading the decision to 
establish anything about the mens rea for the crime is a stretch. Between the two 
Supreme Court cases, Brewster provides some guidance on the mens rea for the 
crime (the donee must have knowledge of the facts—that is, knowledge that the 
donor gave him the gift because of an official act) but Sun-Diamond does not. 
In United States v. Schaffer, the D.C. Circuit decided the first case after 
the Supreme Court narrowed the gratuities crime in Sun-Diamond.249 The 
                                                                                                                
crystal bowl worth $524. See United States v. Sun-Diamond, 138 F.3d 961, 964–65 (D.C. 
Cir. 1998), aff’d, 526 U.S. 398 (1999). Count II charged that Sun-Diamond paid $3,100 for 
Secretary Espy’s girlfriend to accompany him to the International Nut Conference in 
Athens, Greece. Id. at 965 n.1. The jury convicted on Count I and acquitted on Count II. See 
id. at 965 n.1. 
245. Sun-Diamond, 526 U.S. at 414 (affirming the D.C. Circuit’s judgment 
reversing the conviction). 
246. Id. at 413. The district court’s instructions stated that the government must 
prove that the defendant “knowingly and willingly” gave the gifts “at least in part” because 
of the public official’s position. The court used the terms “knowingly and willingly” three 
times in describing what the government must prove about the defendant’s conduct. See id. 
247. The Court’s characterization of the question in the case was narrow. The 
Court stated, “[t]he point in controversy here is that the instructions went on to suggest that 
§ 201(c)(1)(A), unlike the bribery statute, did not require any connection between 
respondent’s intent and a specific official act.” Id. at 405. The Court’s statement of the 
holding was also narrow. The Court concluded, “[w]e hold that, in order to establish a 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A), the Government must prove a link between a thing of 
value conferred upon a public official and a specific ‘official act’ for or because of which it 
was given.” Id. at 414. Thus the conviction was reversed. 
248. Id. at 404. 
249. 183 F.3d 833 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
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defendant, an employee of Tyson Foods, was indicted for various political 
corruption crimes, including two counts of gratuities for giving gifts to Secretary 
of Agriculture Mike Espy. The instructions at trial were based in part on a theory 
of accomplice liability and required the defendant donor to have a mens rea of 
intent to participate in the crime and intent to make the crime succeed.250 The 
defendant was convicted on one count of gratuities,251 but the trial court reversed 
the conviction for insufficient evidence of intent to influence, and the D.C. Circuit 
affirmed. 252 
However, requiring evidence of intent to influence produces an 
incoherent result. The Supreme Court pointed out in Sun-Diamond that while the 
crime of bribery requires a mens rea of intent to influence, the crime of gratuities 
does not.253 That difference in mens rea is one of the main distinguishing factors 
between the crimes of gratuities and bribery. The Schaffer opinion is a thorough 
garble of mens reas for gratuities and bribery and does not advance the cause of 
defining the mens rea for gratuities. Furthermore, as the first opinion discussing 
the gratuities crime after Sun-Diamond was decided, the court was not focused on 
mens rea but on fleshing out the meaning of the new requirement of connection to 
a particular official act.254 Rather than helping to define the mens rea for gratuities, 
this case is the poster child for the confused line between the crimes of bribery and 
gratuities.255 
The D.C. Circuit has also articulated a mens rea for the crime of gratuities 
in two other cases, but neither of these involved a gratuities prosecution, so the 
                                                                                                                
250. Id. at 842 n.10 (instructing that the government must prove the defendant 
“intentionally participate[d] in the commission of a crime”; “knowingly associated himself 
with the persons who committed the crime”; “intended . . . to make the crime succeed”; and, 
“knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted the principal offenders in committing the 
crime”). 
251. The conviction was based on the defendant giving Espy four seats at the 
inaugural dinner worth $6,000. See id. at 837, 842. 
252. Id. at 844. The court asks whether a rational jury could find the defendant 
had “the requisite statutory intent to influence,” and then spends several paragraphs 
explaining why the evidence of intent to influence was insufficient. Id. at 842–45. 
253. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404–05 
(1999); see 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1) (2012). Other circuit courts had recognized this difference 
in mens rea for some time. See, e.g., United States v. Patel, 32 F.3d 340, 345 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(“We further note that the instruction Patel requested incorrectly states the law because it 
required the jury to find that Patel gave [the public official] the gratuity in order to influence 
him with respect to the hotel’s sale, which is not supported by the language in 
§ 201(c)(1)(A).”). 
254. See Schaffer, 183 F.3d at 840 (stating that the trial court focused on proof of 
the official act and “we focus our attention there as well”). 
255. In Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319, 1322 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc), 
the D.C. Circuit stated that unlike the anti-bribery provision, the anti-gratuity provision did 
not require that the payment actually influence the performance of an official act. This helps 
somewhat to clarify the confusion generated by Schaffer on the distinction between 
gratuities and bribery, but it does not say anything about the mens rea required for the two 
crimes, specifically whether an intent to influence is required as a mens rea for gratuities. 
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language is dicta. In United States v. Gatling, the defendants were federal officials 
in charge of allocating section 8 subsidized housing, and they were convicted, inter 
alia, on one count of conspiracy to commit bribery.256 On appeal, they claimed the 
evidence of bribery was insufficient and showed only the crime of gratuities.257 
The court rejected this challenge, but in passing stated that the mens rea for 
gratuities is “knowingly and willingly.”258 Repetition of the term “willingly,” 
which was injected into the law by the D.C. Circuit’s typo in Brewster, is not 
helpful in defining mens rea. 
In its most recent case on gratuities, in 2010, the D.C. Circuit announced 
in United States v. Project on Government Oversight (“POGO”) that the mens rea 
for the gratuities crime was intent, and it did not further specify intent as to 
what.259 The court based its conclusion that intent was a required element of the 
crime on the Supreme Court’s Sun-Diamond opinion. According to the POGO 
court, the Supreme Court in Sun-Diamond defined the mens rea for gratuities as 
being intentional.260 This finding was based on the statutory language requiring the 
gift to be given “for or because of an official act.”261 This analysis is dubious on 
many levels. 
In POGO, the question was whether a civil action by the government for 
monetary penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 209(a) required the defendant to have mens 
rea.262 To reach its interpretation of § 209(a), the D.C. Circuit analogized its case 
to Sun-Diamond, but this approach has a number of problems.263 The words in 
question in the two statutes are not similar. In the gratuity crime, the words in 
question were “for or because of an official act,” whereas the words in question in 
POGO were “as compensation for” government work.264 Moreover, the D.C. 
Circuit’s reading of Sun-Diamond as establishing a mens rea of intent is a stretch; 
it depends on picking and choosing language carefully and combining quotes from 
separate passages in Sun-Diamond into a single sentence.265 Finally, even 
assuming the D.C. Circuit’s conclusion that the Supreme Court in Sun-Diamond 
established a mens rea of intent for the gratuities crime is persuasive, that 
statement by the D.C. Circuit is dicta. The POGO case did not involve the 
gratuities statute but a different statute, and one that was being applied in a civil 
                                                                                                                
256. 96 F.3d 1511, 1515 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
257. Id. at 1518. 
258. Id. at 1522 (citing United States v. Campbell, 684 F.2d 141, 149–50 (D.C. 
Cir. 1982)). 
259. 616 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
260. Id. at 554. 
261. The POGO court states: “[T]he Supreme Court has described that language 
as containing an ‘intent element’ namely, a ‘connection between respondent’s intent and a 
specific official act.’” Id. at 550 (citation omitted). 
262. Id. at 548. 
263. Id. at 554. 
264. Id. at 550. 
265. Id. at 550, 554. 
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action rather than as a crime.266 Thus, the D.C. Circuit’s announcement that the 
crime of gratuities has a mens rea of intent is dubious. 
ii. Courts Outside the D.C. Circuit 
aa. Cases Decided After Sun-Diamond 
Courts of Appeals outside the D.C. Circuit have handed down few 
decisions since Sun-Diamond was decided,267 and only three decisions mention 
mens rea at all. In United States v. Hoffman, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a 
gratuities conviction despite the defendant’s arguments that the instructions were 
error and the proof insufficient.268 The defendant’s main argument was that the 
gifts he gave to the public official were personal and had no connection to an 
official act.269 On mens rea, the court first characterizes the elements instruction, 
which did not include mens rea, as correct.270 This suggests that gratuities is a 
strict liability crime. But later in the opinion, the court quotes a previous Eighth 
Circuit case on the point that “the government must prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant intended to reward the [public official].”271 The court then 
concludes without further elaboration that the instructions were not error and the 
proof of the “requisite intent to reward” was sufficient.272 This decision is 
internally inconsistent on whether mens rea is required.273 
In United States v. McCarter, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit issued an 
unpublished opinion in which it found the evidence of gratuities and bribery 
sufficient.274 The court stated that although the defendant’s receipt of things of 
value did not necessarily establish her “knowledge of illegal activities or requisite 
intent to violate the law, . . . there was sufficient evidence of her knowledge and 
intent to support her conviction.”275 The court uses the words knowledge and intent 
but leaves unspecified knowledge of what and intent to do what. This decision also 
has little value because it is unpublished, and it lumps bribery and gratuities 
                                                                                                                
266. POGO is a civil case where the decision was based on criminal law 
principles. The statutes provided two ways for the government to enforce this standard: 
through criminal prosecution or a civil action. In POGO, the government chose a civil 
enforcement theory. But the court resolves the elements of the civil violation by referring to 
the background principles of criminal law. The statutory language of the prohibition in 
§ 209(a) was the same for both criminal and civil enforcement, but the relevance of the 
criminal law principles in a civil enforcement case is not obvious. 
267. See Eliason, supra note 22, at 930 n.3. 
268. 556 F.3d 871, 875, 878 (8th Cir. 2009). 
269. Id. at 874. 
270. Id. at 875. 
271. Id. at 876 (quoting United States v. Patel, 32 F.3d 340, 344–45 (8th Cir. 
1994)). 
272. Id. at 877. 
273. The decision also includes a dissent arguing that the defendant’s mens rea 
did not coincide with the conduct. See id. at 878–79 (Bye, J., dissenting,). 
274. 219 F. App’x 921, 930 (11th Cir. 2007) (unpublished). 
275. Id. 
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together in the discussion, making specific conclusions on the mens rea for 
gratuities impossible.276 
Finally, in United States v. Antico, the court discussed whether Sun-
Diamond had any impact on the requirement of a quid pro quo in Hobbs Act 
prosecutions and concluded it did not.277 In recounting the holding of Sun-
Diamond, the court refers to the Supreme Court’s recognition of a required 
connection between “the public official’s intent and a specific official act.”278 That 
is the only reference to mens rea in Antico. The unexplained reference to intent is 
not helpful, and at any rate, it is dicta because this is not a gratuities case. In sum, 
these three decisions addressing mens rea, including one that is dicta and one that 
is unpublished, are not good authority. 
bb. Cases Decided Before Sun-Diamond 
The case law from other circuits before Sun-Diamond is similarly not 
helpful. Some cases recount the elements of gratuities without including any mens 
rea factor.279 Sometimes the decisions are opaque: The courts merely announce a 
conclusion on mens rea without explanation or authority.280 Sometimes the 
opinions are internally inconsistent on mens rea.281 
                                                                                                                
276. See id.  
277. 275 F.3d 245, 259–60 (3d Cir. 2001). 
278. Id. at 260. 
279. See United States v. Strand, 574 F.2d 993, 995 n.2 (9th Cir. 1978) (stating 
that the gratuity statute requires only that the thing of value be either unlawfully given or 
unlawfully accepted for the proper discharge of official duty). 
280. See United States v. Patel, 32 F.3d 340, 344–45 (8th Cir. 1994) (instructing a 
jury that the government had to prove that defendant donor had intent to reward donee); 
United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding evidence of 
defendant’s intent sufficient without specifying intent to what). 
281. See United States v. Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 940 (5th Cir. 1995), overruled 
on other grounds by 526 U.S. 398 (1999) (stating several times that no mens rea was 
required but then finding proof sufficient that defendant public official knew he was 
receiving a gift of a loan guaranty); United States v. Previte, 648 F.2d 73, 82 (1st Cir. 1981) 
(stating that defendant donee must have “guilty knowledge”; that he must have “the specific 
intent to violate the substantive statute”; and that an instruction requiring the defendant to 
act “knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully” was not plain error); United States v. Evans, 572 
F.2d 455, 479, 480–82 (5th Cir. 1978), overruled on other grounds by 526 U.S. 398 (1999). 
In Evans, the Court found evidence sufficient for jury to infer defendant’s “guilty 
knowledge.” Id. at 479. The Court also stated that statute makes it illegal for a public 
official to accept a thing of value to which he is not lawfully entitled, “regardless of the 
intent of the donor or donee”; however, the Court found evidence sufficient that defendant 
accepted the things of value “knowingly and purposefully and not through accident, 
misunderstanding, inadvertence or other innocent reasons.” Id. at 480–81. The Court wrote: 
“The jury was well justified in concluding that Evans accepted the money and favors with 
knowledge that the payments were made because of his official position.” Id. at 482. In 
United States v. Irwin, the Court affirmed a conviction based on a jury instruction that 
defendant must act willfully, knowingly, and intentionally, as distinguished from 
inadvertently or negligently. 354 F.2d 192, 196–98 (2d Cir. 1965). The Court stated that 
 
456 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 55:417 
Sometimes the case law is contradictory within a circuit.282 Sometimes 
the authority does not exist as cited,283 and sometimes the cases mischaracterize 
the statute.284 In some cases, the definition of the mens rea is clouded by the 
presence of an aiding-and-abetting theory or a conspiracy charge.285 Sometimes the 
courts garble the discussion of the mens rea for gratuities with the mens rea for 
bribery.286 Sometimes the holding on mens rea is so intertwined with the Sun-
Diamond issue (whether the government must prove a particular official act) that 
besides the fact that the cases have been overruled on other grounds, the 
conclusion on mens rea is called into question.287 Sometimes the mens rea 
language is dicta.288 Sometimes the court is reviewing only for plain error.289 In 
                                                                                                                
“for or because” language requires a “particular state of mind, design or purpose, which is 
the essence of intent.” Id. at 197. The Court also stated that the government must prove that 
the defendant committed the prohibited act “knowingly and purposefully and not through 
accident, misunderstanding, inadvertence or other innocent reasons” and that iniquity of 
procuring public officials is destructive “be it intentional or unintentional.” Id. at 196–97. 
282. Compare Irwin, 354 F.2d at 197–98 & n.3 (affirming conviction based on 
jury instruction that defendant must act willfully, knowingly, and intentionally, as 
distinguished from inadvertently or negligently), with United States v. Umans, 368 F.2d 
725, 730 (2d Cir. 1966) (stating that gratuities are criminal “regardless of the intent of either 
payor or payee with respect to the payment”). 
283. See Umans, 368 F.2d at 730. Umans cites Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 198 (2d Cir. 
1965), for the proposition that the gratuity statute makes it a crime when an official receives 
a sum he is not entitled to receive “regardless of the intent of either payor or payee with 
respect to the payment”; however, that proposition is not supported by the Irwin decision at 
that cite. Id. The Irwin court states that the trial judge “fully and correctly” charged the jury 
that the defendant must have acted willfully, knowingly and intentionally. Irwin, 354 F.2d at 
197–98 & n.3. 
284. See Strand, 574 F.2d at 995 n.2 (stating that the gratuity subsections “require 
only that the thing of value be given or accepted ‘otherwise than as provided by law for the 
proper discharge of official duty,’” thereby omitting any reference to statutory language that 
the thing of value be given or accepted for or because of an official act). 
285. See United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662, 681 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that 
evidence did not permit jury to find that defendant knew his father received stock as a bribe 
or gratuity and without that knowledge, the defendant’s conviction for aiding and abetting 
the crime could not stand); Previte, 648 F.2d at 81–82 (holding that the instruction on 
conspiracy to accept gratuity was not plain error). 
286. See United States v. Biaggi, 853 F.2d 89, 99–100 (2d Cir. 1988) (affirming 
two counts of conviction for gratuity but using bribery terms “in exchange for” and “quid 
pro quo”); United States v. Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079, 1082 (9th Cir. 1976) (stating that 
evidence supported the gratuities conviction, but the donor knew that donee was in position 
to affect conditions of confinement). 
287. See United States v. Bustamante, 45 F.3d 933, 940–41 (5th Cir. 1995); 
United States v. Standefer, 610 F.2d 1076, 1080 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc); United States v. 
Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 482 (5th Cir. 1978); Alessio, 528 F.2d at 1082. All four cases were 
overruled on other grounds by United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 
U.S. 398 (1999). 
288. See Strand, 574 F.2d at 995 n.2. 
289. See Previte, 648 F.2d at 82 (holding that instruction was not plain error). 
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one case, the opinion was unpublished.290 Reading the cases to determine the mens 
rea for gratuities is an exercise in all the sources of ambiguity in common law 
authority. 
iii. Summary 
This analysis of the case law demonstrates that the courts have failed to 
develop a coherent theory of mens rea for the gratuities crime. To the extent that 
the case law can be said to establish any mens rea, it is that defendants who are 
donees must have knowledge of the facts. This conclusion is supported by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Brewster.291 The Second Circuit corroborated this 
conclusion in United States v. Biaggi.292 In Biaggi, the court reversed Richard 
Biaggi’s gratuities conviction for aiding and abetting a donee (his father, 
Congressman Biaggi) because the evidence was insufficient that defendant 
Richard knew that shares of stock were given to his father as a bribe or a 
gratuity.293 This case is fair authority for the proposition that a donee cannot be 
convicted of gratuities without knowledge of the facts, although the clarity of the 
holding on the mens rea is impaired somewhat by the presence of the aiding-and-
abetting theory of prosecution.294 Although we may discern this tiny nugget of 
mens rea law from the cases, the overriding message is that the courts have not 
defined a mens rea for gratuities. 
b. The Proposed Mens Rea 
In considering the best mens rea term to add to an expanded gratuities 
statute, the first step is to recognize that the mens rea required for the donor and 
the donee need not be the same. Courts have concluded that the liability of the 
donor and public official is not interdependent and need not be coextensive.295 As 
a practical matter, imposing different mens rea elements for donors and donees 
                                                                                                                
290. United States v. Gaines, Nos. 92-5446, 92-5501, 1993 U.S. App. Lexis 
15310 (4th Cir. 1993) (unpublished). 
291. See supra Part V.D.2.a.i. 
292. 909 F.2d 662, 690–93 (2d Cir. 1990). 
293. Id. at 681. 
294. See Biaggi, 909 F.2d at 681; United States v. Previte, 648 F.2d 73, 81–82. 
Generally, courts hold that aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2 requires a mens rea of 
intent to promote the underlying crime. See, e.g., United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912, 920 
(6th Cir. 1972); see generally SIXTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL) 
§ 4.01(2)(C) (2001) (requiring a mens rea for aiding and abetting of “intent” to help commit 
the underlying crime). But the Biaggi court discusses the defendant’s mens rea in terms of 
knowledge, and it follows that up by citing cases holding that an aider and abetter must have 
the same mental state as the principal. 909 F.2d at 681. 
295. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 572 F.2d 455, 480 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing 
United States v. Anderson, 509 F.2d 312, 333 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Miller, 340 
F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1965)). 
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would be relatively easy because the statute covers these actors in separate 
subsections.296 
Considering the liability of the donor and donee as distinct questions, 
what mens rea term is appropriate for donees? Conviction should require 
knowledge of the facts. In other words, public officials must know that they are 
federal public officials who received a thing of value for or because of their 
official position. If the official did not know all these items, the mens rea element 
would not be met and the public official would not be liable. This mens rea 
element would require, inter alia, that donees know they received a gift for or 
because of their official position. If they thought they received the gift based on a 
personal relationship, they would have a failure-of-proof defense that they lacked 
the mens rea.297 
Although knowledge of the facts should be required, knowledge of the 
law should not be required. With these defendants, who are necessarily public 
officials, the law can safely rely on the background presumption of the common 
law that defendants know the law.298 This presumption is particularly appropriate 
in the context of the gratuities crime where all the defendants who are donees 
would necessarily be government employees who are trained.299 They should be 
careful.300 
And what mens rea is most appropriate for defendants who are donors? 
As with donees, the mens rea should require knowledge of the facts. This means 
                                                                                                                
296. Donors are covered in 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(1)(A) and donees are covered in 
§ 201(c)(1)(B). 
297. For such a defense, the defendants would have to establish that they thought 
it was exclusively based on personal factors—see mixed-motive cases, previously discussed 
in Part II. 
298. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 193 (1998); Cheek v. United States, 
498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991). 
299. See, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1, 20 (D.D.C. 2009), 
aff’d, 649 F.3d 688 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (recounting evidence that defendant attended ethics 
training course required annually of all GSA employees and that he received ethics training 
materials). 
300. See Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319, 1331 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) 
(Kavanaugh & Williams, JJ., concurring): 
Covered public officials who want to stay clearly on the safe side of the 
criminal-law line (not to mention comply with the phalanx of 
non-criminal regulatory provisions in this area) therefore would be 
well-advised not to accept certain gifts in the first place, rather than 
pinning their hopes on after-the-fact arguments premised on statutory 
terms such as “in return for” or “official act” or “official duty.” In other 
words, absent an authorization or exception, public officials might 
decline monetary gifts and ensure that trips, tickets, and the like are paid 
for by the officials themselves, by the government when so allowed, or 
(in the case of elected officials) by a campaign or political committee 
when so allowed. That’s certainly simpler, cleaner, and cheaper than 
attempting to argue afterwards that a particular gift was not linked to an 
official action. 
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that donors would have to know that they gave a thing of value to a federal public 
official for or because of the official’s position. 
At this point, the best mens rea for donors and donees diverges. In 
addition to knowledge of the facts, conviction of donors should require knowledge 
of the law. Donors should be liable for the gratuities crime only if they knew it was 
illegal to give things of value to public officials for or because of their official 
position. Donors are not public officials but are presumably private citizens. They 
are not trained. This requirement of knowledge of illegality responds to courts’ 
concerns that the crime does not provide notice and fair warning to the average 
citizen that the conduct is criminal.301 The Supreme Court has endorsed requiring 
knowledge of illegality when the criminal conduct is not “inevitably nefarious”302 
or “inherently malign.”303 Giving a gift to a public official for or because of his or 
her official position falls handily into the category of crimes that should require 
knowledge of illegality. This crime for donors warrants an exception to the general 
rule that ignorance of law is no defense. 
When Congress uses the term “willfully” to require the government to 
prove that the defendant knew his conduct was illegal, one question that arises is 
what level of knowledge the government must prove to satisfy this requirement.304 
Does the defendant have to know of the particular statute he is violating, or is 
knowledge that the conduct is generally illegal sufficient? In United States v. 
Bryan,305 the Supreme Court concluded that the term “willfully” in a firearm 
statute requires only general knowledge of illegality.306 Congress apparently agrees 
with this interpretation, because in 2010, it added a definition of the term willfully 
to the healthcare fraud statute that adopts this position.307 If this approach, which 
was adopted by the Court in Bryan and by Congress for healthcare fraud, was 
applied to the term “willfully” in the gratuities statute, this would mean that the 
government only has to prove that donors knew generally that gifting because of 
position was illegal. The government would not have to prove that the donor knew 
of § 201(c)(1)(A) and intended to violate it. 
                                                                                                                
301. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 411 (1999); 
Valdes, 475 F.3d at 1323. 
302. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 144 (1994). 
303. Arthur Anderson LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 703–04 (2005). 
304. See, e.g., United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 161–62 (2d Cir. 2004). 
305. 524 U.S. 184 (1998). 
306. Id. at 195 n.23, 196. 
307. See 18 U.S.C. § 1347(b) (2012). No legislative history explains Congress’s 
purpose in adding this definition to § 1347(b) exactly, but Congress made the same change 
at the same time to another healthcare fraud statute, the anti-kickback statute (42 U.S.C. 
§ 1320a-7b(b) (2012)), and the legislative history of that addition states that the purpose is 
to make it clear that the government need only prove “that the defendant knew that the 
conduct in question was unlawful, but not that it was a violation of the anti-kickback statute 
per se.” See JENNIFER STAMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND ABUSE 
LAWS AFFECTING MEDICARE AND MEDICAID: AN OVERVIEW 5 (2010), available at 
http://aging.senate.gov/crs/medicaid20.pdf. 
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Congress can impose these mens rea requirements relatively easily. The 
Supreme Court generally interprets the term “knowingly” in criminal statutes to 
require knowledge of the facts but not the law.308 The Supreme Court generally 
interprets the term “willfully” in criminal statutes to require knowledge of 
illegality.309 Thus, the gratuities statute could require the mens reas discussed 
above by providing that donees would be liable if they acted “knowingly” and 
donors would be liable if they acted “knowingly and willfully.” Once these mens 
rea elements were added, they would carry along with them the usual mens rea 
doctrines: Jurors would be instructed that knowledge could be established by proof 
of willful blindness310 and that they could infer the defendants’ mens reas based on 
the defendants’ conduct.311 
This approach to avoiding overcriminalization, which is based on the 
criminal law’s traditional way of avoiding overcriminalization by relying on the 
limiting impact of a mens rea element, has benefits for both the individual 
gratuities crime and for federal criminal law generally. For the crime, the addition 
of the mens rea element will resolve the confusion over mens rea discussed earlier 
in the Article.312 To the extent the courts have established any coherent mens rea, 
the one proposed is consistent with that case law in requiring a mens rea of 
knowledge of the facts for donees. The proposed mens reas (knowledge of the 
facts for donees and knowledge of the facts and law for donors) also add an 
appropriate differentiation in the scope of the crime for public officials and private 
citizens. By requiring knowledge of the law for donors, the mens rea element 
responds to concerns that the crime may not provide adequate notice.313 
For federal criminal law generally, the addition of mens rea terms is also 
healthy. Congress should consider and include these important elements when it 
adopts the crime rather than just leave the matter to the courts for case-by-case 
definition.314 
                                                                                                                
308. See Bryan, 524 U.S. at 193 & n.15 (characterizing Liparota v. United States, 
471 U.S. 419 (1985) as an exception to this rule). 
309. See id. at 193; Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 141–49 (1994); Cheek 
v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199–200 (1991); Potter v. United States, 155 U.S. 438, 446 
(1894); see also United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 703 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kavanaugh, 
J., concurring). 
310. See, e.g., United States v. Heredia, 483 F.3d 913, 918 n.4 (9th Cir. 2007) (en 
banc); United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976) (en banc). 
311. SIXTH CIRCUIT PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL), § 2.08(2)–(4) 
(2011) (inferring required mental state); see also Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 615 
n.10 (1994) (“We, of course, express no view concerning the inferences a jury may have 
drawn regarding petitioner’s knowledge from the evidence in the case.”). 
312. See supra Part V.D.2. 
313. See, e.g., Valdes v. United States, 475 F.3d 1319, 1323 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
314. See Myers, supra note 11, at 1878. 
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VI. THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
In this Article, I discussed how the crime of gratuities should apply to 
four situations.315 Comparing these four situations among themselves helps sort out 
and identify the relative harm of each. 
A. Locating These Four Situations on a Continuum of Harm 
If these four possible applications of the gratuities crime are arranged on a 
single continuum of harm, the least harmful is obviously personal gifts, which are 
appropriately not criminal at all. These can be characterized as having a zero 
percent risk of harm. At the other end of the spectrum, gifts because of an official 
act to be performed in the future present the greatest likelihood of harm. Here, the 
likelihood of bias and influence on government process is so great that the crime 
should be classified as a type of bribery. We would locate the two remaining 
situations—gifting because of past official acts and gifting because of the donee’s 
position—between these two poles, again based on the likelihood of harm in the 
form of biased public officials. These two situations are dangerous to equality in 
government, but the danger is not as certain as when the gift is tied to a particular 
future act. These situations are appropriately treated as the crime of gratuities. The 
idea that political corruption crimes can be effectively defined by analyzing the 
harm caused by the conduct has recently been persuasively articulated by Lisa 
Kern Griffin.316 She argues that although political corruption crimes are difficult to 
define with precision, focusing on the harm the conduct causes to the political 
system—in the form of distortion to public officials’ neutral decisionmaking—is 
the best way to mark out the contours of corruption crimes.317 That analysis is 
useful here in defining the appropriate scope of the gratuities crime; this is because 
social science research establishes that the harm to society presented by donors 
gifting officials due to their positions is not limited to the appearance of 
impropriety but is based on the risk of actual bias in public officials’ conduct.318 
B. Specifics: Proposed Amendments 
To implement the changes to the crime of gratuities proposed in this 
Article, Congress needs to amend the statute. The version below includes the 
changes suggested in this Article. Deleted material is indicated by a strike-through 
and new material is indicated by an underline. 
(c) Whoever otherwise than as provided by law for the proper discharge 
of official duty— 
(1) directly or indirectly knowingly and willfully gives, offers, or 
promises anything of value to any public official, former public 
official, or person selected to be a public official, for or because of 
                                                                                                                
315. See supra Part I.C. 
316. Lisa Kern Griffin, Adaptation and Resiliency in Legal System: The Federal 
Common Law Crime of Corruption, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1815 (2011). 
317. Id. at 1817–18.  
318. See id. at 1837; see also supra Part V.B.1. 
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(A) the official’s position, or 
(B) any official act performed or to be performed by such public 
official, former public official, or person selected to be a public 
official; 
or 
(2) being a public official, former public official, or person selected 
to be a public official, otherwise than as provided by law for the 
proper discharge of official duty, directly or indirectly knowingly 
demands, seeks, receives, accepts, or agrees to receive or accept 
anything of value personally for or because of 
(A) the official’s position or 
(B) any official act performed or to be performed by such 
official or person; 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, 
or both. 
Changes in the statutory subsection on gratuities include the amendments 
advocated in this Article. One change is that forward-looking gratuities have been 
eliminated because they are indistinguishable from bribery. This change was 
implemented by deleting the words “or to be performed” following the term 
official act.319 The second change is that a status-based theory of liability was 
added. In other words, donors and donees may now be liable for the crime of 
gratuities if they give or receive things of value because of the donee’s position. 
This change is manifested by adding the words “the official’s position” following 
the phrase “for or because of.”320 The third amendment is that mens rea terms have 
been added to the statute. As described above, the donor will be required to have a 
mens rea of knowledge of the facts (knowledge that they are giving a thing of 
value to a public official for or because of the official’s position or official act 
performed) and knowledge that such conduct is illegal. This change was 
implemented by adding the terms “knowingly and willfully” to the subsection 
covering donors.321 For donees, a mens rea of knowingly has been added, which 
requires that those defendants have knowledge of the facts (knowledge that they 
are receiving a thing of value for or because of their position or official act 
performed) but not knowledge of the law.322 In addition, the proposed new 
subsection on gratuities includes some minor323 and stylistic changes.324 
                                                                                                                
319. The words “or to be performed” were deleted from 18 
U.S.C. §§ 201(c)(1)(B), (c)(2)(B) (2012). 
320. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 201(c)(1)(A), (c)(2)(A). 
321. See id. § 201(c)(1). 
322. See id. § 201(c)(2). 
323. The proposed subsection includes four minor changes. In the subsection on 
donees, subsection (c)(2), the word “personally” has been deleted for two reasons. This 
word is inconsistent in that it does not appear in the subsection on donors, and this word is 
not important in that it has not been discussed in any of the case law. In both subsections, 
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C. Attitude of Congress and the Courts 
Congress may be receptive to the idea of modifying the gratuities crime 
as suggested in this Article. In the past, Congress has reacted to Supreme Court 
decisions that narrow a crime by amending the statute to reverse the Court.325 
Although the Senate was considering a bill to expand various political corruption 
crimes, including gratuities, the bill recently died.326 
Defining gratuities because of an official’s position as a crime is 
consistent with the Court’s reliance on analyzing the nature and extent of the harm 
in the criminal context and in the political corruption context. Gifting to public 
officials because of their positions can be defined as conduct where injury in the 
form of biased public officials is sufficient to warrant criminalizing the conduct.327 
In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., the Court concluded that a judge’s refusal to 
recuse himself was a violation of the Due Process Clause.328 The Court’s 
evaluation of the harm did not depend on finding that the judge was actually 
biased,329 nor on finding that the judge’s participation in the case presented the 
appearance of impropriety. Rather, the Court’s analysis focused on the objective 
probability of actual bias.330 Under this approach, when a donor transfers value to a 
public official because of his or her position, the recent influence research shows a 
significant objective risk that the public official will be biased; the harm is not 
limited to the appearance of impropriety. This decision supports the proposal to 
expand the crime of gratuities, although other Supreme Court decisions can be 
found which suggest the Court might not initiate such an expansion on its own.331 
                                                                                                                
the phrase “directly or indirectly” has been deleted because it has no meaning and has never 
come up in the courts. In the subsection on donees, subsection (c)(2), the phrase “otherwise 
than as provided by law for the proper discharge of official duty” has been deleted because 
it is redundant. Finally, some language was deleted in the last line of the subsection on 
donors, subsection (c)(1), because it was unnecessary and also inconsistent with the 
language used in subsection (c)(2). 
324. The stylistic change was that the outline headings were reordered to be more 
efficient and to clearly indicate alternatives. The new outline headings would require 
renumbering current subsections (c)(2) and (c)(3) as (c)(3) and (c)(4), respectively. 
325. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135 (1994), rev’d by Riegle 
Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994 § 411, 31 U.S.C. 
§§ 5322(a), (b), 5324(c) (2012) (crime of structuring transactions); McNally v. United 
States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987), rev’d by 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012) (crime of mail fraud). 
326. See Public Corruption Prosecution Improvements Act, S. 401, 112th Cong. 
(as introduced in the Senate, Feb. 17, 2011). The Senate did not take action and the 
proposed 2011 bill died. 
327. Cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (noting that “injury to a 
person or abuse of an institution the law protects” is generally necessary for the government 
to make conduct unlawful).  
328. 556 U.S. 868, 890 (2009). 
329. Id. at 2263. 
330. Id. at 2263, 2265. 
331. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910–
11 (2010) (stating that the appearance of influence will not harm democratic governance 
and that ingratiation and access are not corruption); see also Brown, supra note 11, at 1372–
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CONCLUSION 
This Article urges Congress to extend the crime of gratuities to cover gifts 
because of an official’s position rather than leave the crime to cover only gifts 
because of particular official acts. The danger of gifting based on official positions 
to bias-free government is demonstrated in the recent research on influence and 
reciprocity. This influence is especially dangerous because participants are 
oblivious to its impact. This conduct is not adequately controlled by mandated 
disclosure or ethics prohibitions. When Congress amends the gratuities crime to 
expand it, Congress can avoid the dangers of overcriminalization by inserting mens 
rea elements into the statute, which it should have incorporated when it first 
drafted the statute. The appropriate mens rea terms are knowledge of the facts for 
donees and knowledge of the facts and law for donors. A secondary point of this 
Article is that Congress should remove one situation, when donors transfer value 
to donees because of future official acts, out of the gratuities crime because it is 
indistinguishable from the crime of bribery. With these changes, the federal crime 
of gratuities will be revived. 
                                                                                                                
74 (analyzing the Supreme Court’s attitude as of 2006 toward political corruption as it bears 
on gratuities). 
